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INTRODUCTION
Solar power is a leading element in the transition to low-carbon
power.1 In the U.S., booming solar development has focused on two
primary markets: larger utility-scale solar farms, and smaller residential-
scale rooftop installations.2 Community-scale solar is a largely untapped
market in the middle of this spectrum.3 One emerging mechanism to
procure community-scale solar is the concept of shared solar, or community
solar. Broadly, this concept involves a group of grid-connected electricity
consumers, each with an interest in a solar facility or the power it produces.
That interest is typically realized in the form of electricity bill credits tied to
the output of the solar facility.4
However, this broad definition of community solar omits an important
distinction. For many policymakers and advocates, community solar is
more specifically motivated by energy justice—a potential to serve low-
income communities and other vulnerable groups who bear the brunt of
environmental damage associated with energy development, face a higher
energy cost burden, and simultaneously have been locked out of many
energy benefits.5 In the U.S., solar power provides a particularly recent and
prominent example of this type of energy injustice. Distributed rooftop
1. See, e.g., Renewables 2018, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/renewables2018/
power/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2019) (noting that in 2017 renewable power capacity additions “accounted
for more than two-thirds of global net electricity capacity growth,” with solar photovoltaic capacity
outstripping other renewable technologies, and forecasting that under prevailing market and policy
conditions solar power will continue to lead other technologies from 2018 to 2023).
2. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., COMMUNITY-SCALE SOLAR: WHY DEVELOPERS AND BUYERS
SHOULD FOCUS ON THIS HIGH-POTENTIAL MARKET SEGMENT 2 (2016), https://rmi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Shine-Report-CommunityScaleSolarMarketPotential-2016.pdf [hereinafter
Community-Scale Solar].
3. See id. at 6 (identifying approximately 750 gigawatts of long-term potential community-
scale solar capacity across five customers types, including low- and moderate-income households,
renters, and residential and commercial buildings with unsuitable roof space for rooftop solar).
4. See infra note 273 (describing the bill credit mechanism for community solar in Hawaiʻi).
5. See infra Part I.C (discussing community solar’s potential as a tool for energy justice);
Alice Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1146 (2009) (“Emissions are
disproportionately concentrated in disadvantaged areas since many of the most significant emissions
sources, like refineries, power plants, transportation corridors, ports, and other industrial land uses, are
located in poor and minority neighborhoods.”); Melissa Powers, An Inclusive Energy Transition:
Expanding Low-Income Access to Clean Energy Programs, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 540, 556–57 (2017)
(discussing evidence showing that “[l]ow-income communities and households in the United States face
a higher energy and transportation burden than their middle- and upper-income counterparts”); Shelley
Welton, Grid Modernization and Energy Poverty, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 565, 585–96 (2017) (describing
various definitions and lines of evidence for energy poverty in the U.S.).
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solar, for all its benefits, has been largely accessible only to single-family
homeowners.6
The promise of community solar is rooted in its potential to expand
solar access to other groups via innovative and flexible models that are
designed to respond to community needs.7 But to realize that potential, a
variety of implementation barriers and shortcomings must be addressed. In
this context and others, the challenge of energy justice is the challenge of
injecting justice principles into an energy realm typically dominated by
technology and business considerations.
Securities laws aptly illustrate this challenge. A century after the
operative definition of a security was born, the law continues to heft
considerable uncertainty upon the scope of what constitutes a security.8
Applied to community solar, the complexity involved in managing that
uncertainty tilts the field in favor of electric utilities and a century-old
business model, over more modern community-focused energy initiatives.9
This Article deploys two tools to evaluate this securities uncertainty
more closely. First, it moves the question of whether community solar is a
security away from hypothetical scenarios and individualized project-by-
project analyses. Instead, the question is evaluated in the context of
Hawaiʻi’s community solar program and tariff, recently approved by utility
regulators.10 In renewable energy circles, Hawaiʻi’s policy has earned the
moniker a “postcard from the future.”11 In hope that Hawaiʻi’s story can
provide useful lessons for other jurisdictions, Parts I and II provide details
on how and why the State’s community solar program evolved, and how
the securities issues arose in a way that threatened to limit the ability of
community solar to innovate around energy justice principles.
In the Article’s second half, it reviews how the definition of a security
has developed under federal and state securities laws (Part III). To add
context, Part III also takes a new look at how energy development—in the
form of “visionary oil wells” in Minnesota—may have injected uncertainty
into the definition of a security at its inception.
6. See infra Part I.B (describing inequitable access to solar power).
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See infra Part III (discussing the evolution of uncertainty in the definition of a security).
9. See infra notes 124–31 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part I.D (describing the development of Hawaiʻi’s community solar policy).
11. See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, What Comes After Net Metering: Hawaiʻi’s Latest
Postcard from the Future, UTILITY DIVE (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/what-
comes-after-net-metering-hawaiis-latest-postcard-from-the-future/407753/ (“Renewables policy issues
in [Hawaiʻi] are commonly referred to as postcards from the future because the high penetration
of solar on the isolated island’s grid has forced the power sector into changes that many
observers expect to hit the mainland in the coming years.”).
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Through the lens of economic reality mandated by that definition, Part
IV analyzes whether community solar is a security under Hawaiʻi’s
program framework. Hawaiʻi again provides a suitable context for this
question, because the State is home to a leading formulation of the risk
capital test for determining whether a transaction involves a security.12
Other jurisdictions use the federal test enunciated in SEC v. W. J. Howey
Co.13 Community solar projects in Hawaiʻi may be subject to both tests.14
Part IV focuses on applying the risk capital test, in part because prior
analyses have not, in part because it overlaps substantially with the Howey
test, and in part because some commenters assert that it is the broader test
and thus more likely to ensnare community solar.
Unlike most prior analyses, this Article concludes that community
solar interests are unlikely to be securities if they are part of a regulated
utility tariff like Hawaiʻi’s, and if one properly utilizes the concept of
economic reality. Alas, that conclusion cannot resolve the uncertainty that
appears to be embedded in the definition of a security. Moreover, this
phenomenon may echo deeper into the transition to a low-carbon electricity
grid, as access to other innovations becomes similarly mired in securities
uncertainty.15
Ahead of those impacts, community solar presents an opportunity to
use the securities definition to re-envision the boundary between electricity
regulators and securities regulators, in a way that accounts for 21st century
electricity innovations. That re-envisioning also presents an opportunity, in
an admittedly incremental way, to operationalize energy justice principles
in a manner that is replicable, long-lived, and responsive to the climate
crisis.16
12. See generally Haw. Comm’r of Sec. v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr. Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Haw. 1971)
(adopting the risk capital test in Hawai‘i) [hereinafter Hawaii Market Center].
13. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
14. See infra notes 335–36 and accompanying text (describing the interplay between federal
and state laws).
15. See infra notes 344–46 and accompanying text (describing the potential role of securities
issues in a transactional electric grid).
16. The ties between community solar and energy justice are not the focus of this Article.
Professor Shalanda Baker has eloquently discussed those ties—and gaps—elsewhere. Shalanda H.
Baker, Unlocking the Energy Commons: Expanding Community Energy Generation, in LAW AND
POLICY FOR A NEW ECONOMY 211, 223–27 (Melissa K. Scanlan ed., 2017) [hereinafter Baker,
Unlocking the Energy Commons].
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I. THE STORY OF COMMUNITY SOLAR IN HAWAIʻI
A. The Rise of Rooftop Solar
In the rooftop solar realm, Hawaiʻi’s “postcard from the future”
reputation is well-deserved. The State’s net energy metering tariff was
launched by legislation in 2001.17 This sparked a run of exponential growth
that lasted more than a decade, with a doubling or near-doubling of total
installed rooftop solar capacity in nine of ten years following 2004.18 It is
estimated that more than 30% of single-family homes in Hawaiʻi generate
rooftop solar power.19 Overall, rooftops and other distributed sites supply
more than 80% of the State’s solar power.20
The effects of this booming market rippled throughout the State’s
energy sector and, indeed, its entire economy.21 At the height of the boom,
solar installations reportedly accounted for more than a quarter of
construction expenditures in the State.22 On Oʻahu, the State’s most
17. H.B. 173, 2001 Leg., 21st Sess. (Haw. 2001).
18. Data on installed capacity were obtained from HAWAIIAN ELEC. CO., INC., HAW. ELEC.
LIGHT CO., INC. & MAUI ELEC. CO., LTD., HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC COMPANIES 2017 NET ENERGY
METERING STATUS REPORT 1 (2018), https://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NEM-HECO-
2017.pdf; see also Mark James et. al., Planning for the Sun to Come Up: How Nevada and California
Explain the Future of Net Metering, 8 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 42 (2017) (“As of 2016,
only [Hawaiʻi] has reached the point where net metering displaces more than 2% of total generation.”).
19. See DAVID FELDMAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., Q4 2017/Q1 2018 SOLAR
INDUSTRY UPDATE 36 (2018), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/71493.pdf (“[Hawaiʻi], California,
and Arizona have residential systems on an estimated 31%, 11%, and 9% of households living in single-
family detached structures.”).
20. See 2017 Renewable Portfolio Standard Status Report Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc. et al. at
3, In re Haw. Renewable Portfolio Standards Law, No. 2007-008 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n Feb. 8,
2018) [hereinafter Renewable Portfolio Report], https://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/RPS-HECO-2017.pdf (reporting 142,868 megawatt hours of photovoltaic and
thermal solar generation, and 862,638 megawatt hours of customer-sited grid-connected generation);
Kauai Island Utility Cooperative Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) Status Report at Exhibit A, No.
2007-008 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n Mar. 3, 2018), https://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/RPS-KIUC-2017.pdf (reporting 69,502 megawatt hours of generation from
various utility-scale solar projects and 50,994 megawatt hours of generation under various distributed
solar tariffs).
21. See generally HAW. STATE ENERGY OFFICE, HAW. DEP’T OF BUS., ECON. DEV. &
TOURISM, HAWAII ENERGY FACTS & FIGURES 20 (2013), http://energy.hawaii.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/EnergyFactFigures_Nov2013.pdf (describing a variety of metrics and impacts
related to renewable energy development in Hawaiʻi).
22. See id. at 13 (“Rooftop distributed solar has become one of the state’s leading industries,
accounting for almost 26% of all construction expenditures in 2012.”). This estimate is apparently
derived from reported solar building permit values, as a percentage of total building permit values. Since
reaching a high of 29% in 2012, this value fell to 14.4%, 10.2%, and 5.6% in 2015, 2016, and 2017,
respectively. Solar-Related Construction Expenditures, DATA.HAWAII.GOV, https://data.hawaii.gov/
dataset/Solar-Related-Construction-Expenditures-value-of-s/ja28-jmt2 (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
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populous island and home to the primary metropolitan center, distributed
solar provides more grid electricity than any other source of renewable
power.23 Meanwhile, the State’s oil imports for electricity generation are
falling, down nearly 30% since 2006.24
Framed another way, rooftop solar has become a driving force in a
rapidly evolving renewable energy revolution.25 Most states have adopted
renewable portfolio standards, mandating that electric utilities shift toward
renewable energy.26 In Hawaiʻi, the first U.S. state to adopt a 100%
renewable portfolio standard, private installations of rooftop solar are a key
source of energy enabling the public utility to satisfy this obligation.27 In
this light, the rooftop solar boom reveals a remarkable, and remarkably
unplanned,28 evolution in the role electricity consumers play in driving the
transition to low-carbon power.
Moreover, rooftop solar has helped to push forward a new paradigm
for ensuring that electric utilities heed the public interest. In the short term,
rooftop solar injects an aspect of competition that can help to address
fundamental asymmetries between the interests of investor-owned utilities
23. See Renewable Portfolio Report, supra note 20 (showing that in 2017 Hawaiian Electric’s
customer-sited, grid-connected renewable generation accounted for 605,502 megawatt hours, compared
to the next highest source, biomass, at 381,138 megawatt hours).
24. See HAW. DEP’T OF BUS., ECON. DEV. & TOURISM, MONTHLY ENERGY TRENDS,
http://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/economic/data_reports/energy-trends/Monthly_Energy_Data.xlsx (last
visited Apr. 27, 2019) (reporting 12,237,023 barrels of oil consumed for electricity in 2006, compared to
8,880,040 in 2017).
25. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power, 2018 UTAH L.
REV. 49, 53, 70 (2018) (illustrating some of the ways that the proliferation of rooftop solar can
transform the electrical market).
26. See GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., U.S. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARDS 2018 ANNUAL STATUS REPORT 6 (2018), http://eta-
publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/2018_annual_rps_summary_report.pdf (summarizing mandatory
renewable portfolio standards in 29 states, covering more than half of U.S. electricity sales).
27. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-92 (Supp. 2017) (mandating a 100% renewable portfolio
standard by December 2045); Press Release from the Governor of Hawaiʻi, Governor Ige Signs Bill
Setting 100 Percent Renewable Energy Goal in Power Sector (Jun. 8, 2015),
https://governor.hawaii.gov/newsroom/press-release-governor-ige-signs-bill-setting-100-percent-
renewable-energy-goal-in-power-sector/ (announcing the adoption of the State’s 100% renewable
portfolio standard).
28. In a 2008 agreement intended to help move the State “move decisively and irreversibly
away from imported fossil fuel for electricity and transportation and towards indigenously produced
renewable energy and an ethic of energy efficiency,” the utilities and state agencies targeted 23
megawatts of net metering rooftop solar capacity for the island of Oahʻu by 2015. ENERGY AGREEMENT
AMONG THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI, DIVISION OF CONSUMER ADVOCACY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE & CONSUMER AFFAIRS, AND HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC COMPANIES 1, 45 (Oct. 2008) (on file
with author). This target under-predicted the actual capacity by an order of magnitude. See HAWAIIAN
ELECTRIC COMPANIES 2015 NET ENERGY METERING STATUS REPORT (2016),
https://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/NEM-HECO-2015.pdf (reporting 258 megawatts
installed through 2015).
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and the interests of the public.29 In the long term, the rise of the utility
“prosumer” may radically re-shape the energy system, moving from a
unidirectional hierarchy molded by top-down decisions from utilities and
regulators, toward a more distributed and democratic model in which
consumers (who are also producers) are more deeply involved in energy
decisions.30
B. The Stark Reality of Inequitable Access to Solar Power
Hawaiʻi’s rooftop solar boom was fueled by a variety of factors.
Federal and state tax benefits,31 a plug-and-play net metering policy that
made it easier to understand the implications of installing residential
rooftop solar,32 and strong public sentiment in favor of solar power33 all
undoubtedly played a role. In 2015, Hawaiʻi became the first state to shutter
its net metering program,34 partly in response to concerns voiced over the
29. See generally Order 32052 at Exhibit A: Commission’s Inclinations on the Future of
Hawai‘i’s Electric Utilities, In re Integrated Resource Planning, No. 2012-0036 (Haw. Pub. Util.
Comm’n Apr. 28, 2014). The Commission noted that “[w]ith the growth of utility-scale and distributed
renewable resources, [Hawaiʻi’s] electricity system is changing at an unprecedented pace and scale.” Id.
at 6. The Commission identified the role of distributed solar generation in challenging “fundamental
tenets of the long-standing regulatory compact,” and discussed technical, market, and public policy
changes related to “better align[ing] the [utility companies’] business model with customers’ interests
and public policy goals.” Id. at 27, 29.
30. See id. at 16–17 (describing the utilities’ role in the evolving landscape of renewable
energy); see also Eisen & Mormann, supra note 25, at 53 (describing an energy market model in which
distributed resources are transformed “from a marginalized locus to the center stage on which the future
of the electricity sector will be decided”); Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV.
571, 584–85 (2017) [hereinafter Welton, Clean Electrification] (describing a “vision that regulators
have for transforming passive ‘ratepayers’ into active ‘participants’ in the fight against climate
change”).
31. See 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. 2018) (providing a 30% federal investment tax
credit for solar photovoltaic installations); HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-12.5 (2018) (providing a 35% state
investment tax credit for solar photovoltaic installations). In 2015, Congress extended the residential
solar investment tax credit beyond 2017, while establishing a phase out of the credit to occur in 2022.
See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 303, 129 Stat. 2242, 3039 (2016).
32. HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-102 (2018). But see Heather Payne, A Tale of Two Solar
Installations: How Electricity Regulations Impact Distributed Generation, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 131,
160–61 (2016) (illustrating that while net energy metering is perceived as simple from the consumer
standpoint, and that this simplicity is a critical component of consumer uptake, a number of policy
choices embedded within net energy metering regulations actually make it much more complex than
often perceived).
33. See UNIV. OF HAW. CTR. ON THE FAMILY, PUBLIC ATTITUDES ABOUT RENEWABLE
ENERGY IN HAWAIʻI 4 (2014), http://uhfamily.hawaii.edu/publications/brochures/
9314e_14101012_COF_RenewableEnergy_Report-FINAL.pdf (reporting that 92% of poll respondents
responded that solar power is “a good idea for Hawaiʻi,” a higher percentage than any of the other
polled energy sources).
34. See Decision and Order No. 33,258, Instituting a Proceeding to Investigate Distributed
Energy Resource Policies at 163 (No. 2014-0192) (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n Oct. 12, 2015) (“[T]he [net
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potential for unfair cost-shifting in favor of utility customers with
residential rooftop solar, to the detriment of non-participating utility
ratepayers.35 Perhaps even more than other solar-intensive jurisdictions, this
solar fairness debate in Hawaiʻi lacked a quantitative evaluation of the full
range of benefits and costs associated with rooftop solar.36 Moreover,
Hawaiʻi’s debate suffered by conflating a “cost-shifting” rhetoric with the
more pertinent concept of paying one’s fair share.37 As a result, Hawaiʻi’s
net metering debate and the ongoing evolution of the residential rooftop
metering] program for the HECO Companies’ service territories is fully subscribed. Therefore,
applications submitted after the date of this Order shall not be eligible for the [net metering] program.”).
35. See, e.g., id. at 42 (recounting the Consumer Advocate’s position that net metering and
similar tariffs result in a cost-shift to non-participants because fixed costs are not fully recovered from
participants). It appears that the Commission did not adopt a position on this cost-shift assertion, finding
only that “to the extent there is a negative impact to non-participating customers from current DER
policy design, the interim options approved and ordered herein will alleviate that impact.” Id. at 166.
36. See, e.g., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. ELECTRICITY INNOVATION LAB, A REVIEW OF SOLAR
PV BENEFIT & COST STUDIES 22 (2d ed. 2013), https://rmi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/RMI_Document_Repository_Public-Reprts_eLab-DER-Benefit-Cost-
Deck_2nd_Edition131015.pdf (summarizing 16 cost-benefit factors from various jurisdictions in the
U.S., each utilizing a different mix of assumptions and considerations, and thus reaching a range of
differing results; some studies found a net benefit to distributed generation tariffs and some found a net
cost); see also VT. PUB. SERV. DEP’T, EVALUATION OF NET METERING IN VERMONT CONDUCTED
PURSUANT TO ACT 99 OF 2014 at 17, Exhibit 10 (Nov. 7, 2014) (finding a net benefit associated with a
typical residential net metering installation).
37. See Jon Wellinghoff & James Tong, Wellinghoff and Tong: A Common Confusion Over
Net Metering is Undermining Utilities and the Grid, UTILITY DIVE (Jan. 22, 2015),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/wellinghoff-and-tong-a-common-confusion-over-net-metering-is-
undermining-u/355388/. Former Chair of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Jon Wellinghoff
and his co-author James Tong have eloquently warned against conflating these two concepts:
Critics assert [net metering] customers use the grid but do not pay their fair share
of the costs. They say that [net metering] shifts grid costs to non-solar ratepayers,
especially lower-income households and minorities. . . . “Nonsense,” reply [net
metering] advocates. “[Net metering] critics don’t care about ratepayer fairness –
they care about protecting profits and monopolies for utilities that have never
faced competition.” They contend that, far from shifting costs, [net metering]
customers create net value to the grid and all grid users. One only need look to a
study commissioned by the neutral Nevada Public Utility Commission that shows
[net metering] customers provide a net present value benefit of $36M to non-[net
metering] customers in Nevada. However, both arguments miss the point. That is
because both use “cost-shifting” and “not paying the fair share” interchangeably.
This understanding is wrong – critically wrong. And it is resulting in needlessly
fractious debates and bad policies, including arbitrary fixed fees on solar
customers.
Id. Wellinghoff and Tong used a net metering benefit-cost study commissioned by the California
Public Utilities Commission to illustrate their point, noting that the report found a net cost-shift in favor
of net metering customers, while simultaneously finding that, on average, solar customers paid 103% of
their cost-of-service (averaged between residential and non-residential customers). Id. (discussing
ENERGY + ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS, INC., CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING RATEPAYER
IMPACTS EVALUATION 10, tbl. 5 (2013), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Website/
Content/Utilities_and_Industries/Energy/Reports_and_White_Papers/NEMReportwithAppendices.pdf).
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solar market have fewer lessons for other jurisdictions than the “postcard
from the future” label might suggest.
However, in at least one respect, the rooftop solar boom in Hawaiʻi and
elsewhere was indisputably inequitable. More than a third of occupied
housing units in Hawaiʻi are located in multi-unit dwellings such as
condominiums, rather than single-family homes.38 Without a roof of one’s
own it is difficult, and often impossible, for residents of multi-unit
dwellings to install solar panels. Nationally, it is estimated that “[h]alf of
America’s population cannot participate in the solar revolution because
they either live in a home that cannot support a solar array or rent an
apartment.”39
To illustrate the starkness of this differential access, consider
Honolulu, Hawaiʻi’s most populous county (which similarly has about half
of its population living in multi-unit buildings).40 Approximately 97% of
Honolulu’s residential solar building permits issued through June 2017
were for single-family homes.41 This cries out for a policy response.42
C. The Potential of Community Solar as a Tool for Energy Justice
Distributed solar’s imbalance toward single-family homes reflects an
array of broader social disparities such as income, home ownership, and
other factors that solar power cannot address in isolation.43 But the concept
38. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2013-2017 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR ESTIMATES,
HAWAIʻI, https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/cf/1.0/en/county/Honolulu County, Hawaii/HOUSING
(follow “Physical Housing Characteristics for Occupied Housing Units” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 27,
2019) [hereinafter ACS HOUSING DATA].
39. Kevin B. Jones & Mark James, Distributed Renewables in the New Economy: Lessons from
Community Solar Development in Vermont, in LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW ECONOMY 189, 201
(Melissa K. Scanlan ed., 2017).
40. See ACS HOUSING DATA, supra note 38 (showing that in 2017 Honolulu County had over
150,000 occupied housing units in multi-unit buildings, out of approximately 311,000 total occupied
housing units).
41. See, e.g., RES. & ECON. ANALYSIS DIV., HAW. DEP’T BUS., ECON. DEV. & TOURISM,
SOLAR PV INSTALLATIONS IN HONOLULU: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON BUILDING PERMIT DATA 2, tbl. 1
(2017), http://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/economic/data_reports/Solar_PV_Installation_In_Honolulu_
Sep2017.pdf (reporting that, through June 2017, 53,869 of 55,288 total residential solar building permits
were issued for single-family homes); see also Act 100, S.B. 1050, 2015 Leg., 28th Sess. (Haw. 2015)
(“While residential solar energy use has grown dramatically across the State in recent years, many
residents and businesses are currently unable to directly participate in renewable energy generation
because of their location, building type, access to the electric utility grid, and other impediments.”).
42. Although one might expect the ratio of single-family to multi-family permits to be some
multiple greater than one—reflecting, perhaps, the average number of units in multi-family dwellings—
a ratio of 97:1 is plainly skewed.
43. See Makena Coffman et al., Determinants of Residential Solar Photovoltaic Adoption 3,
15–17 (Univ. Haw. Econ. Research Org., Working Paper No. 2018-1),
http://www.uhero.hawaii.edu/assets/WP_2018-1.pdf (finding that owner-occupancy rates, prevalence of
786 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 43:777
of equitable access—a fundamental principle of energy justice44—is
squarely within the realm of regulated electricity systems.45 In Hawaiʻi and
elsewhere, community solar arose directly from the need to improve the
equity of solar access.
In 2015, the same year that Hawaiʻi adopted a 100% renewable
portfolio standard, Act 100 launched the State’s community-based
renewable energy program.46 The same concept has sprung up around the
country with a variety of names, such as shared solar, neighborhood net
metering, and community solar gardens. Each of the labels connotes the
same general concept—a mechanism for utility customers to gain credit on
their electric bill, from power generated by solar panels installed
somewhere other than their own roof.47 I will collectively describe these
programs using the label community solar.48
single-family residences, and income are the “most influential” demographic factors explaining the
differences in solar adoption between census tracts). Professor Coffman and her co-authors observed the
particular importance of owner-occupancy in relation to solar access: “Owner-occupancy is particularly
important because landlords and renters suffer from what is referred to as a ‘principal-agent’ problem,
where renters lack autonomy over decision-making regarding capital investments and landowners face a
disconnect between cost and benefits of capital investments in rental assets.” Id. Other factors are also
related to solar access, such as income, roof orientation and shading, and customers living on circuits
saturated with existing solar installations. Less technical factors, such as race, also play a role. See, e.g.,
Deborah A. Sunter et al., Disparities in Rooftop Photovoltaics Deployment in the United States by
Race and Ethnicity, 2 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 71, 73 (2019) (finding that disparity in rooftop
solar distribution remains even after accounting for differences in household income and home
ownership).
44. See, e.g., Shalanda H. Baker, Mexican Energy Reform, Climate Change, and Energy
Justice in Indigenous Communities, 56 NAT. RESOURCES J. 369, 379 n.72 (2016). Professor Baker
provides this brief introduction to energy justice principles:
Lakshman Guruswamy was one of the first to define energy justice,
framing energy justice as a moral obligation to ensure that those who lack access
to clean energy, the energy poor, have access to clean energy technologies that
limit exposure to harmful indoor pollutants . . . . In the intervening
years, energy justice has evolved to incorporate principles of climate justice,
environmental justice, and energy democracy.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Kirsten Jenkins et al., Humanizing Sociotechnical Transitions Through
Energy Justice: An Ethical Framework for Global Transformative Change, 117 ENERGY POL’Y 66, 67
(2018) (describing the core notions of energy justice as the “‘three A’s’ of availability, accessibility and
affordability”).
45. See, e.g., William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV.
1614, 1643 (2014) (describing the core of the regulatory compact: “In return for an exclusive franchise,
the right of eminent domain, and an ability to sell electricity at reasonable rates, electric utilities would
provide reliable, universal service . . . .”).
46. Act 100, S.B. 1050, 2015 Leg., 28th Sess. (Haw. 2015).
47. See infra note 273 (describing the bill credit mechanism).
48. This terminology is selected as a matter of convenience and familiarity. However, it should
be noted that Hawaiʻi’s “community-based renewable energy tariff” is open to other forms of renewable
generation, in addition to solar. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-27.4 (2018) (defining the “community-
based renewable energy tariff,” without limiting eligible renewable technologies); HAW. REV. STAT.
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Hawaiʻi’s community solar legislation was expressly aimed at
addressing the solar access problem:
While residential solar energy use has grown dramatically across
the State in recent years, many residents and businesses are
currently unable to directly participate in renewable energy
generation because of their location, building type, access to the
electric utility grid, and other impediments. The [community
solar] program seeks to rectify this inequity by dramatically
expanding the market for eligible renewable energy resources to
include residential and business renters, occupants of residential
and commercial buildings with shaded or improperly oriented
roofs, and other groups who are unable to access the benefits of
onsite clean energy generation. The legislature finds that it is in
the public interest to promote broader participation in self-
generation by [Hawaiʻi] residents and businesses through the
development of [community solar] facilities in which participants
are entitled to generate electricity and receive credit for that
electricity on their utility bills.
. . .
The purpose of this Act is to establish the [Hawaiʻi] community-
based renewable energy program to make the benefits of
renewable energy generation more accessible to a greater
number of [Hawaiʻi] residents.49
Community solar projects developed at any size might provide some of
these accessibility benefits, including larger utility-scale solar projects that
may be (almost incidentally) marketed as community solar to a wide array
of consumers.50 But the true promise of community solar as a tool to
expand accessibility and promote justice is more likely found in models that
focus on existing community networks, such as apartment buildings, low-
income housing developments, church congregations, or other community
groups.51 These projects are more likely to be driven by community-focused
§ 269-91 (2018) (defining “renewable energy” to include power derived from wind, the sun, falling
water, biogas, geothermal sources, ocean water, currents, and waves, biomass, biofuels, and hydrogen
produced from renewable energy sources).
49. Act 100, S.B. 1050 (emphasis added).
50. See generally Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 30 (analyzing the contours of
energy justice and a more participatory grid).
51. See id. at 581 (“The history of electrification counsels that our most successful grid
experiments in terms of equity and empowerment may come from focusing on more collective forms of
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motives and objectives, to serve the needs of a real community, and to
empower community decision making on energy infrastructure.52
These community-focused community solar projects are also likely to
be developed at community-scale.53 To date, solar development programs
have typically focused on the two ends of the scale spectrum: large utility-
scale solar farms and small behind-the-meter distributed generation.54
Observers note the massive potential for solar power in the middle of this
spectrum.55 Under traditional utility programs, community-scale solar
developments may not be able to bear transactional costs and processes
associated with utility-scale solar projects, nor can they always qualify for
the plug-and-play distributed generation tariffs that have been successful in
the residential rooftop solar market.56 The concept of community solar
grid participation. Thus, regulators might pay particular attention to programs like community solar and
micro-grid formation for the community-scale participation that they embody.”).
52. Id.; see also Baker, Unlocking the Energy Commons, supra note 16 (criticizing the
community solar models advanced by most states for “leav[ing] ‘community’ out of the equation,” and
explaining the advantages of community energy projects that are more integrally tied to low-income and
vulnerable communities); see also Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 30, at 581 (“The history of
electrification counsels that our most successful grid experiments in terms of equity and empowerment
may come from focusing on more collective forms of grid participation. Thus, regulators might pay
particular attention to programs like community solar and micro-grid formation for the community-scale
participation that they embody.”); cf. Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 338–43
(2017) [hereinafter Welton, Public Energy] (arguing in favor of local ownership and control over
electric utilities, to allow for benefits such as flexibility, experimentation, and altruistic sorting, and to
create a mechanism for local communities to influence a “larger, dynamic national conversation about
our role as local and global citizens in an era of significant climate disruption”). But see Powers, supra
note 5, at 555–56, 559–61 (2017) (acknowledging that community solar may be able to improve access
to solar power, but expressing skepticism that it can deliver broader benefits to large numbers of low-
income communities, particularly for programs that rely on carve-outs for low-income participation).
53. See Community-Scale Solar, supra note 2, at 1 (providing that community-scale solar is
inclusive and accessible to low-income groups).
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 6 (estimating community-scale solar market potential at more than 750 gigawatts
across five customer classes: low- to middle-income renters, other renters including in multi-unit
dwellings, multi-unit dwelling non-renters, single-family homes with unsuitable roof space for rooftop
solar, and commercial buildings with unsuitable roof space for rooftop solar).
56. But see KEVIN BREHM ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL
FOR COMMUNITY-SCALE SOLAR: HOW RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES CAN USE LOW-COST,
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY TO SAVE MONEY, SERVE CUSTOMERS, AND UNLOCK BILLIONS IN
INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING 6 (2018), https://rmi.org/insight/progress-potential-community-scale-solar/
(“[Community-scale solar] is large enough to leverage the economies of scale enjoyed by utility-scale
solar systems, so it can be developed at costs that are highly competitive with renewable and
nonrenewable power generation. Like behind-the-meter solar, community-scale solar can be flexibly
located and can provide distributed benefits including avoided transmission energy line losses, deferral
of distribution infrastructure upgrades, and increased resilience.”).
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offers a revenue mechanism, and a revenue-sharing mechanism, to unlock
the middle of the market.57
Depending on context and program design, community solar might
offer other benefits too. For example, experience with community solar in
New York and Vermont suggests that community solar can be more cost-
effective than other solar installations of a similar size.58 Cost benefits
associated with community solar may come from several directions. For
example, in the distributed solar industry, customer acquisition is a
substantial cost component.59 Developers assert that the cost of customer
acquisition is also significant for community solar, and that it represents an
incremental cost in comparison to solar farms operating under more
traditional utility power-purchase agreements.60 Community solar can lower
57. See, e.g., Jones & James, supra note 39, at 206 (describing the revenue mechanism
available under Vermont’s group net metering program).
58. ROBERT MARGOLIS, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, Q1/Q2 2018 SOLAR INDUSTRY
UPDATE 36 (2018), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/72036.pdf (“Since the start of 2016, 16
community solar projects have reported pricing in New York, with average rates substantially lower
than other PV systems in New York of comparable size.”); Jones & James, supra note 39, at 206–07
(discussing a Vermont case study and noting that “[t]he community owned solar model brings economy
of scale savings to a project without having to rely on third-party financing”). As in Hawaiʻi, New
York’s regulators established community solar with a focus on accessibility. See, e.g., Order
Establishing a Community Distributed Generation Program and Making Other Findings, Proceeding on
the Motion of the Commission as to the Policies, Requirements and Conditions for Implementing a
Community Net Metering Program at 3, No. 15-E-0082 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jul. 17, 2015) (“As
many of the commentators note, the purpose of Community DG is to open opportunities for
participation in solar and other forms of clean distributed generation to utility customers that would not
otherwise be able to access that generation directly.”).
59. Industry customer acquisition costs are proprietary and not widely shared. However, the
author’s interactions with solar industry insiders, and other sources, suggest that it can be a substantial
cost component for rooftop solar. See Bryan Bollinger & Kenneth Gillingham, Peer Effects in the
Diffusion of Solar Photovoltaic Panels, 31 MARKETING SCI. 900, 910 (2012) (describing, without
citation, the “high cost of consumer acquisition in the solar PV market”); see also Eric Wesoff, Costs to
Acquire US Residential Solar Customers Are High and Rising, GREEN TECH. MEDIA (July 6, 2017),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/costs-to-acquire-us-residential-solar-customers-are-high-
and-rising (describing high acquisition costs reported by an industry analyst).
60. See Joint Responses to Pub. Util. Comm’n’s Information Requests at 2, In re Hawaiian
Elec. Co., Inc., Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., Maui Elec. Co., Ltd. & Kauai Island Util. Coop.,
Community-Based Renewable Energy Program and Tariff, No. 2015-0389 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n
Nov. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Joint Responses]. This coalition of industry and nonprofit groups described
a variety of the costs components related to developing community solar, and asserted:
A critical factor that needs to be considered in developing the credit rates for this
program is the incremental cost associated with a community solar project. While
economies of scale can be leveraged with community solar, the cost and effort
associated with customer acquisition is not insignificant. This can involve market
research; marketing; individual customer outreach and responding to questions;
and ultimately contract negotiations. These represent the greatest incremental
costs involved in a community solar project.
Id.
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these costs by leveraging peer effects and communication channels in an
existing community network.61 Reducing the energy cost burden is an
important component of the energy justice framework.62 Opportunities for
reducing energy costs should not be overlooked.
Energy justice issues are also centrally embedded within the question
of where to site energy infrastructure.63 Community-sited community solar,
where the community hosting a project and the community benefitting from
a project overlap, can empower self-determination and procedural justice in
these siting issues.64 In addition to this project-by-project siting benefit,
community solar appears poised to help address quietly burbling questions
about optimal land use in the broader transition to renewable energy.65
Those questions will be particularly prevalent in a place like Hawaiʻi,
which is contemplating substantial future greenfield utility-scale solar
development, on an inherently limited land area, to achieve its renewable
portfolio standard.66 Successfully siting community-scale solar projects can
relieve some of the pressure to rely on large-scale greenfield development.
61. See Jones & James, supra note 39, at 207 (noting that “[b]ecause of the reduced customer
acquisition costs and other economy of scale savings, the [community solar] model is attractive to local
solar installers who have been able to build these projects for over a dollar per watt less than residential
rooftop projects”); see also Bollinger & Gillingham, supra note 59 (describing “strong evidence for
causal peer effects” in the adoption of distributed solar power).
62. See generally Powers, supra note 5, at 544–45 (noting that low-income community
members often lack the resources to participate in new electricity markets like community solar); Joint
Responses, supra note 60 (“This [cost of marketing, customer acquisition, and customer service] is a
particularly important cost component when incorporating certain segments of the customer base such
as the Staff Proposal’s requiring 40% of each project to be allocated to individual customers less than 50
kW in size, and a 5% capacity allocation for low-to-moderate income customers.”).
63. See, e.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool & Michael H. Dworkin, Energy Justice: Conceptual
Insights and Practical Applications, 142 APPLIED ENERGY 435, 437 (2015) (discussing the use of
energy justice as an analytical tool, and asserting that “[f]ree, prior, informed consent becomes an
essential part of due process and the siting of energy infrastructure”).
64. See generally Phillip Roddis et al., The Role of Community Acceptance in Planning
Outcomes for Onshore Wind and Solar Farms: An Energy Justice Analysis, 226 APPLIED ENERGY 353
(2018); Maarten Wolsink, Wind Power Implementation: The Nature of Public Attitudes: Equity and
Fairness Instead of ‘Backyard Motives,’ 11 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1188, 1203
(2007) (describing the role of fairness and equity in forming perceptions about the suitability of siting
for wind power facilities).
65. Cf. Rebecca R. Hernandez et al., Solar Energy Development Impacts on Change and
Protected Areas, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13579, 13579, 13583 (Nov. 3, 2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4640750/pdf/pnas.201517656.pdf (assessing the impact
of utility-scale solar development on land cover and the alteration of natural ecosystems).
66. See, e.g., Order No. 35286 Approving the Hawaiian Electric Companies’ Proposed Final
Variable Requests for Proposals, With a Modification, In re the Requests of Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc.,
Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., and Maui Elec. Co., Ltd. to Institute a Proceeding Relating to Competitive
Bidding Process to Acquire Dispatchable and Renewable Generation, No. 2017-0352 (Haw. Pub. Util.
Comm’n Feb. 20, 2018) (approving a utility request for proposals to obtain renewable energy, consistent
with a plan to install 400 megawatts of renewable generating capacity by 2021).
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Enabling a community to generate a portion of its own power may
induce other ripple effects. For example, it seems likely that a community
of solar participants, once they are joined together in generation, will be
particularly fertile ground for engaging participants in efficiency programs,
aggregated demand response programs, or other initiatives.67
D. Hawaiʻi’s Transition from Policy to Implementation
Acknowledging the need for a regulatory process to move community
solar beyond conceptual potential benefits, Act 100 provided guidelines for
implementation.68 This legislative guidance underscored the Act’s focus on
equity, envisioning “an open and accessible” regulatory process with a
variety of participating stakeholders.69 It also addressed the tension between
utility-centric models of community solar that might operate more like
utility-scale solar generation and models that might operate more like
distributed generation. The legislature instructed that the program should
“accommodate a variety of [community solar] projects, models, and
sizes.”70
With the community solar program conceived, thus began a long
regulatory gestation period. This included the submission of competing
proposed tariffs by the utility and stakeholders,71 two proposed frameworks
from the staff of the Public Utilities Commission,72 a (relatively rare)
67. Cf. Bollinger & Gillingham, supra note 59, at 911 (asserting that peer effects “are also
likely to apply to the diffusion of other visible green technologies, such as hybrid vehicles, electric
vehicles, geothermal heating, and outdoor high-efficiency lighting”).
68. Act 100, S.B. 1050, 2015 Leg., 28th Sess. (Haw. 2015).
69. Id.
70. Id. Act 100 further underscores the legislature’s intent to spur new models of energy
development by specifying that “[a]ny person or entity may own or operate an eligible community-
based renewable energy project or projects provided that the person or entity complies with all
applicable statutes, rules, tariffs, and regulations governing the ownership and interconnection of such
project or projects.” Id.
71. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., Maui Elec. Co., Ltd.’s Transmittal, In
re Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., Maui Elec. Co., Ltd. & Kauai Island Util. Coop.,
No. 2015-0389 [hereinafter HECO Transmittal] (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n Oct. 1, 2015); Motion to
Intervene by Ulupono Initiative LLC at Exhibit A, In re Application of Hawaiian Elec. Co. Inc., Haw.
Elec. Light Co. Inc., Maui Elec. Co. Ltd., & Kauai Island Utility Coop., No. 2015-0389 (Haw. Pub. Util.
Comm’n Dec. 17, 2015) (attaching, as Exhibit A, a proposed community solar program structure).
72. Order No. 33751 Admitting Intervenors and Participants, Seeking Clarification Regarding
the Stakeholders’ Community-Based Renewable Energy Proposal, and Providing “Draft Haw. P.U.C.
Staff Proposal for Community-Based Renewable Energy Program” for Review and Comment, In re
Application of Hawaiian Elec. Co. Inc., Haw. Elec. Light Co. Inc., Maui Elec. Co. Ltd. & Kauai Island
Util. Coop., No. 2015-0389 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n Jun. 8, 2016) [hereinafter First PUC Proposed
Framework]; Order No. 34388 Addressing Pending Matter and Issuing the Attached Proposed
Community-Based Renewable Energy Program Framework and Model Tariff Language for Review and
Comment, In re the Requests of Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., Maui Elec. Co.
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Commission hearing,73 numerous and lengthy written comments from a
variety of perspectives,74 and utility-stakeholder meetings.
Throughout this gestation, the Commission reiterated Act 100’s focus
on equity. In describing the program’s fundamental parameters, the
Commission’s first draft framework noted that “[t]he long-term objective
for the [community solar] program is to create a market-based framework
that enables greater renewable energy opportunities for customers who are
currently unable to participate in onsite distributed generation (e.g.,
residents in rental housing and condominiums).”75
Similarly, the Commission worked to incorporate legislative guidance
in favor of encouraging a diversity of project sizes76—including
community-scale projects—and business models.77 Rejecting a restrictive
utility proposal,78 the Commission designed its framework to “[a]llow the
marketplace to determine the terms and ownership models” in the
community solar program, leading to “more flexibility and allow[ing] for
business model innovation.”79 For community solar, flexibility and
innovation will be critical parts of realizing its energy justice goals.80 This
Ltd. & Kauai Island Util. Coop., No. 2015-0389 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n Feb. 10, 2017) [hereinafter
Second PUC Proposed Framework].
73. Transcript of Public Hearing at 15, In Re Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., Haw. Elec. Light Co.,
Inc., Maui Elec. Co., Ltd. & Kauai Island Util. Coop., No. 2015-0389 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n Sep.
21, 2016).
74. See Docket Entries Index Report: Docket No. 2015-0389, HAW. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
https://dms.puc.hawaii.gov/dms/DocketIndexReport?docketNumber=2015-0389&f=N (last visited Apr.
27, 2019) (listing submissions by docket parties and participants, and comments submitted by members
of the public).
75. First PUC Proposed Framework, supra note 72, at 1.
76. See id. at 4 (“Encourage CBRE project size diversity. Staff requests comment on the
balance between economies of scale and project size diversity, consistent with the legislative intent of
Act 100. This includes measures to encourage diversity in developer and project size.”); Decision and
Order No. 35137 at att. A 4, In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., Maui Elec. Co.,
Ltd. & Kauai Island Util. Coop., No. 2015-0389 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n Dec. 22, 2017) [hereinafter
PUC Adopted Program Framework] (adopting facility size restrictions intended to “encourage project
size diversity and customer choice”).
77. See PUC Adopted Program Framework, supra note 76, at att. A 9 (“A vibrant CBRE
market should include business model diversity and innovation, as well as accommodate a variety of
ownership models.”).
78. See First PUC Proposed Framework, supra note 72, at 3 (“The HECO Companies’
proposal . . . affords little room for business model innovation. Standardized cost and a flat bill credit
rate gives little flexibility to developers or customer-subscribers . . . . The design also does not provide
adequate market signals to encourage features with added value, such as dispatchability.”).
79. Id. at 5.
80. See Baker, Unlocking the Energy Commons, supra note 16, at 226 (criticizing inflexibility
in community solar programs: “[T]he inflexibility of community solar leaves little room for innovations
that allow communities to take control of their energy production.”).
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regulatory process culminated in a final program framework approved by
the Commission in December 2017.81
II. COMMUNITY SOLAR AND SECURITIES LAWS
To realize the potential of community solar, the next step after policy
approval is implementation. In this regard, Hawaiʻi trails many other
jurisdictions—particularly three jurisdictions that have emerged as
community solar leaders. Since 2008, Massachusetts has enabled the
concept of off-site solar in conjunction with its broader net-metering
program.82 Colorado and Minnesota passed “community solar garden”
legislation in 2010 and 2013, respectively.83 Today, each of the three states
has substantial community solar capacity online.84 While many other states
have community solar policies or programs in place, none appear to have
yet achieved a similar program scale.85 Given the variety in community
solar laws and policies, wide geography, and the range of approaches to
utility regulation and solar power in general, the pace of implementation
undoubtedly involves a broad range of barriers and challenges.
A. The Securities Issue in Hawaiʻi’s Community Solar Regulatory Docket
During Hawaiʻi’s community solar policy gestation period, the
Hawaiian Electric Companies—the State’s primary investor-owned
81. Adopted Program Framework, supra note 76, at 118–19.
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 140 (2018).
83. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-127 (2018); MINN. STAT § 216B.1641 (2018).
84. See Community Solar Project Database, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
https://data.nrel.gov/submissions/95 (July 27, 2018) (identifying more than 167 megawatts of
community solar capacity in Massachusetts, 158 megawatts in Minnesota, and 65 megawatts in
Colorado, through Spring 2018); John Farrell, Why Minnesota’s Community Solar Program is the Best,
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, https://ilsr.org/minnesotas-community-solar-program/ (last updated
Apr. 15, 2019) (reporting 513 megawatts of community solar garden operational capacity in February
2019); Press Release, Xcel Energy Colorado, Colorado Community Solar Projects Awarded (July 20,
2018), https://electricenergyonline.com/article/energy/category/solar/142/713159/colorado-community-
solar-projects-awarded.html (forecasting 80 megawatts of capacity by the end of 2018); Community
Solar, COLO. ENERGY OFFICE, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/energyoffice/community-solar (last
visited Apr. 27, 2019) (reporting, without a date, “nearly 70 community solar project in operation
generating more than 50 MW, and many more in development”).
85. See, e.g., Community Solar Project Database, supra note 84 (identifying community solar
projects in 38 states plus Washington, D.C.); see also Community Solar, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N,
https://www.seia.org/initiatives/community-solar (last visited Apr. 27, 2019) (reporting that at least 19
states and D.C. have adopted community solar programs or policies, and that 42 states have at least one
community solar project online).
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utility86—devoted large portions of its regulatory briefing to highlighting a
risk that community solar projects would be treated as securities.87 In
unusually strong terms, the utility accused the Commission of “disregard
for the ‘securities’ issues presented by the purchase, lease or subscription of
[community solar] program interests as contemplated by the
[Commission’s] Framework.”88 The utility described this as “a potential
fatal flaw, since if just one [community solar] facility is deemed to be a
security and found in violation . . . this may cause the entire [community
solar] market to lose confidence in the program.”89
The utility asserted that the Commission’s framework exposed the
companies (and thus utility ratepayers) to massive securities risk,
potentially reaching multi-billion dollars:
[T]he Hawaiian Electric Companies could potentially face
securities laws penalties from the SEC of up to $231,868,093
(assuming a $50,000 penalty per violation and 4,637 Participants
[in the first phase of the community solar program]). The total
penalty amount could increase exponentially if the higher end of
the penalty range of $500,000 is applied for each violation and/or
a violation is defined as a monthly transaction between the
Hawaiian Electric Companies and Participants to credit
Participants for the energy output of their interest in a
[community solar] project.90
86. “Hawaiian Electric Companies” denotes three investor-owned utilities that operate the
electric grid on all but one of the main Hawaiian islands: Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. (Oahʻu),
Hawaiʻi Electric Light Company, Inc. (Hawaiʻi), and Maui Electric Company, Ltd. (Maui). These are
owned by a single parent entity, Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc., and in some respects are operated as
a single entity. Briefing in the community solar docket, for example, was submitted on behalf of all
three companies. HECO Transmittal, supra note 71. The Kauai Island Utility Cooperative serves the
island of Kauai. Utility Resources: Utility Landscape in Hawaii, HAW. STATE ENERGY OFFICE,
http://energy.hawaii.gov/developer-investor/utility-resources (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
87. For example, approximately 30% of the Hawaiian Electric Companies’ comments on the
Commission’s second proposed program framework were devoted to the securities issue. Comments on
Proposed CBRE Program Framework and Model Tariff at 8–9, 31–43, In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc.,
Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., Maui Elec. Co., Ltd. & Kauai Island Util. Coop., No. 2015-0389 (Haw. Pub.
Util. Comm’n Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter HECO Comments on Second PUC Proposal]. The issue was
also raised repeatedly in the companies’ comments on the Commission’s first proposed framework.
Comments on Draft Hawaii P.U.C. Staff Proposal for Community-Based Renewable Energy Program at
i–ii, 7–9, 13, 26, 27, 30, 33, In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., Haw. Elec. Light Co., Inc., Maui Elec. Co.,
Ltd. & Kauai Island Util. Coop., No. 2015-0389 (Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n Jun. 30, 2016) [hereinafter
HECO Comments on First PUC Proposal].
88. HECO Comments on Second PUC Proposal, supra note 87, at 31.
89. Id. at 9.
90. HECO Comments on First PUC Proposal, supra note 87, at 8–9.
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At their core, the utility’s securities arguments were focused on utility
control over the design of community solar, rather than control by
communities and developers. Act 100 and the Commission’s proposals
tipped the scale in favor of communities and developers, and in favor of
project diversity in project size and participation model. The utility’s
proposed tariff was antithetical to this concept. It would have utilized a
standard participant agreement under which material terms, including the
price developers would charge consumers for participating in a community
solar project, would be fixed.91 The utility asserted that:
Allowing the marketplace, i.e., Developers, to determine the
terms and ownership models applicable to Participants in the
[community solar] program will exacerbate the securities issues
already inherently present in the program by eliminating all
safeguards proposed by the Hawaiian Electric Companies to
ensure that [community solar] interests are not “securities”
requiring registration under federal and state securities laws.92
The utility proposed to seek no-action letters from state and federal
securities regulators, using the fixed program parameters as the underlying
facts and circumstances to be reviewed by regulators.93
B. Other Instances of the Community Solar/Securities Issue
Although the utilities’ arguments about the scale of possible securities
risk appears unprecedented, this securities issue was not invented by the
Hawaiian Electric Companies. Several analyses suggest that there is a
significant likelihood that community solar interests will be regulated as a
security or suggest that community solar projects should take the
precautionary measure of seeking statutory exemptions from the
requirement that securities be registered before they are offered to the
public. Those analyses include at least two student-written law review
publications,94 online posts by lawyers and law firms,95 and policy briefs by
91. HECO Transmittal, supra note 71, at 21 (“To ensure simplicity for Participants, the upfront
payment per kW AC, credit rate per kWh, and O&M Fee per kWh will be required to be the same for all
projects within each tier for each technology and island.”).
92. HECO Comments on First PUC Proposal, supra note 87, at 7.
93. Id. at 34.
94. Samantha Booth, Comment, Here Comes the Sun: How Securities Regulations Cast A
Shadow on the Growth of Community Solar in the United States, 61 UCLA L. REV. 760, 760 (2014);
Kristin L. Bailey, Note, Insecurity for Community Solar: Three Strategies to Confront an Emerging
Tension Between Renewable Energy Investment and Federal Securities Laws, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 123, 123 (2012).
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entities such as the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and others.96 At
least one analysis concludes that it is “very likely” that community solar
will be classified as an investment contract under securities laws, and thus
will be regulated as a security.97
These analyses come with a limited regulatory backdrop. In 2011, a
Texas solar developer named CommunitySun, LLC sought a no-action
letter for its “SolarCondo” concept.98 Although this was not, apparently,
part of a broader community solar regulatory framework, the project
described in CommunitySun’s request for no-action shares key hallmarks of
regulated community solar programs like Hawaiʻi’s:
Ownership of a SolarCondo will allow production of self-
generated, individually owned solar electricity without installing
solar panels at the property where the owner consumes
electricity. The purpose is to provide the benefits of rooftop solar
energy to people who are unable to install rooftop solar on their
property. An additional public benefit is to correct the inequity to
such persons, who pay for solar rebates in the overall electricity
rate base, but who do not have access to solar as a power
alternative.99
The SEC issued a no-action letter in favor of CommunitySun.100
95. E.g., Community Solar and Securities Regulations, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Oct. 18,
2016), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/149962/community-solar-and-
securities-regulations; Part 5: Can Securities Exemptions Eliminate Community Solar Obstacles?,
LEWIS & CLARK L. SCH.: GREEN ENERGY INST. (Oct. 6, 2014), https://law.lclark.edu/live/news/28143-
part-5-can-securities-exemptions-eliminate.
96. E.g., DAVID FELDMAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., SHARED SOLAR:
CURRENT LANDSCAPE, MARKET POTENTIAL, AND THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION
18 (2015) [hereinafter NREL, SHARED SOLAR], https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/63892.pdf; see also
Memorandum from Stoel Rives L.L.P. to Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab. (June 25, 2009) [hereinafter
Stoel Rives Memorandum] (on file with author); DIANA CHACE & NATE HAUSMAN, CONSUMER
PROTECTION FOR COMMUNITY SOLAR: A GUIDE FOR STATES 35 (2017),
https://www.cesa.org/assets/2017-Files/Consumer-Protection-for-Community-Solar.pdf.
97. See Booth, supra note 94, at 811 (asserting that “[b]ecause of the classification of
community solar interests as investment contracts is very likely, developers must be cognizant of the
myriad rules that are triggered by such a finding”).
98. Letter from Paul S. Maco, Vinson & Elkins, to Office of the Chief Counsel, Securities and
Exchange Commission 1 (Aug. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Maco Letter] https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/cf-noaction/2011/communitysun082911-2a1-incoming.pdf. The request for no-action described
the CommunitySun project as selling “real estate interests in a solar facility.” Id.
99. Id.
100. CommunitySun, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 3837626 (Aug. 29, 2011) (“Based
on the facts presented, the Division will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if, in
reliance upon your opinion of counsel that SolarCondos are not securities, CommunitySun offers and
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Conversely, a 2014 order from Vermont’s securities regulator deemed
a series of proposed community solar projects to be securities, before
granting a public interest exemption from registration, in part based upon
the State’s renewable energy policy.101 In 2010, the Deputy Commissioner
of the Colorado Securities Division reviewed a hypothetical subscription in
a community solar project, and determined that it could not be deemed to
absolutely fall outside the definition of a security.102 In Hawaiʻi, the State’s
Securities Commissioner, in response to a request from the Hawaiʻi State
Energy Office, submitted a letter to the Public Utilities Commission
“[c]aution[ing] that [s]ecurities-[r]elated [i]ssues [m]ay [a]rise.”103 At the
time, the program design was incomplete and thus this preliminary
determination was made without the benefit of specific facts or
circumstances.104
C. Dueling Problems of Inflexibility and Uncertainty
The Hawaiʻi Commission’s second proposed framework did not adopt
the Hawaiian Electric Companies’ proposal to tightly constrain program
parameters and then to seek no-action letters based on those fixed
parameters.105 In response,106 the Hawaiian Electric Companies pointed to
California’s approach, where regulators adopted a San Diego Gas &
Electric recommendation to require community solar projects to obtain “a
securities opinion from an AmLaw 100 law firm stating that the
arrangement complies with securities law, and that the [investor-owned
utility] and its ratepayers are not at risk for securities claims associated with
sells the SolarCondos without registration under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.”).
101. Order, In re Registration Exemption for SolarCommunities, Inc., No. 14-022-S, 2014 WL
2514647, at *2 (Vt. Sec. Div. Apr. 21, 2014). The exemption was later rendered null and void by
Vermont’s more general “SUN” registration exemption for some community solar models. See id.
(stating that “if and when the Commissioner issues a general comprehensive order regarding community
solar projects, this Order shall be rendered null and void”); Order, In re Vt. Solar / Util. No-Action
Exemption, No. 14-023-S, 2014 WL 3697670, at *1 (Vt. Sec. Div. July 21, 2014) [hereinafter Vermont
SUN Exemption I] (providing a self-executing registration exemption for eligible community solar
projects).
102. Gerald Rome, Deputy Securities Comm’r, Colo. Div. of Securities, Opinion Letter on the
Issuance, Offer or Sale of a Community Solar Garden (Sept. 22, 2010), as reprinted in Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 13666V.
103. Letter from Ty Nohara, Haw. Comm’r of Sec. to the Haw. Public Utils. Comm’n 3 (Feb. 5,
2016) [hereinafter Nohara Letter].
104. See id. at 2–3 (recognizing that the program design had not yet been completed, and
asserting that “[t]o issue an opinion at this time, without any information as to how the project will be
structured, would be based purely and inappropriately on speculation”).
105. Second PUC Proposed Framework, supra note 72.
106. HECO Comments on Second PUC Proposal, supra note 87, at 34–35.
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the project.”107 Apparently, all of the shortlisted bids in the first request for
offer by California’s investor-owned utilities failed to obtain this opinion
letter; no bids were awarded.108 This requirement was later affirmed by the
California Commission, but it was relaxed to allow opinion letters from
other attorneys meeting prescribed criteria for experience and insurance
coverage.109
Expanding upon California’s approach, the Hawaiʻi utilities argued for
requiring the operators of community solar projects to obtain no-action
letters from federal and state securities regulators, qualify for an exemption
from registration, or secure a lawyer’s opinion letter.110 Hawaiʻi’s
Commission did not adopt the utilities’ proposal, but like the California
107. Decision No. 15-01-051, Approving Green Tariff Shared Renewables Program for San
Diego Gas & Electric Co., and So. Cal. Edison Co. Pursuant to Senate Bill 43, at 71, In re San Diego
Gas & Electric Company (U902E) for Authority to Implement Optional Pilot Program to Increase
Customer Access to Solar Generated Electricity, No. 12-01-008 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Feb. 2, 2015).
Later, this requirement was relaxed to allow for an opinion by smaller law firms. Decision 17-07-007,
Modifying the AmLaw 100 Securities Opinion Requirement for Enhanced Community Renewables
Projects Under the Green Tariff Shared Renewables Program in D.15-01-051, In re San Diego Gas &
Electric Company (U902E) for Authority to Implement Optional Pilot Program to Increase Customer
Access to Solar Generated Electricity, No. 12-01-008 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n July 13, 2017).
108. Brian Orion, STOEL RIVES, California Community Solar Forum Points to Need for Reforms
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.lawofrenewableenergy.com/2017/04/articles/solar/report-on-community-
solar-developer-forum-in-california/. California’s community solar offerings have subsequently grown,
but not as fast as one might expect from the country’s largest potential market. As of June 2017, the
California PUC reported approximately 22 megawatts enrolled in the program. CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N, COMMUNITY SOLAR PROGRAM FOR DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES WEBINAR 8 (2018),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/About_Us/Organization/Commissioners/
Martha_Guzman_Aceves/California%20PUC%20Community%20solar%20Program%20webinar.pdf.
In October 2018, Southern California Edison filed an application to replace the community renewables
program, and other programs, with a modified “Green Energy Program.” See Application at 2, In re
Application of So. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) for Approval of Green Energy Programs, No. A.18-09-
015 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Sep. 26, 2018) (“Numerous barriers for customers and developers,
including program caps and sizing restrictions, make it difficult for SCE to subscribe customers to either
GTSR program.”). In December 2017, the utility requested to sunset the existing community solar
program at the end of 2018, “due to the low number of participating customers.” Id.
109. See Decision 17-07-007, supra note 107, at A1 (modifying the earlier AmLaw 100
requirement such that lawyers with five full-time years of securities experience within the last eight
years, licensed in California, and carrying a minimum of $10 million in professional liability coverage
could provide an opinion letter).
110. See HECO Comments on Second PUC Proposal, supra note 87, at 33. The utilities asked
the commission to:
[R]equire concrete evidence from [community solar] program Subscriber
Organizations that their [community solar] program interests are not “securities,”
either by securing “no-action” letters from the SEC, qualifying for a specific
exemption confirmed by the SEC or an opinion letter from appropriate expert
counsel, and or . . . obtain clearance from the State of Hawaiʻi, under its broader
blue sky laws, that such program interests are either not “securities” or not subject
to enforcement by the Hawaiʻi Securities Commissioner.
Id.
2019] Is Community Solar Really a Security? 799
Commission it acknowledged substantial uncertainty about this issue
nationally.111
The utilities’ first proposal, setting inflexible program parameters,
would have created an energy justice barrier by limiting the ability of
communities and developers to create projects and models that directly
respond to community needs.112 This second utility proposal would have
begrudgingly permitted more flexibility, but created a new barrier for all
community solar projects in the form of the time, complexity, and cost
involved in satisfying the proposed securities requirements.113 The relative
shadow of that barrier is even larger for community-scale, community-
driven community solar projects.
At the same time, uncertainty about whether community solar interests
are securities creates its own barriers for communities and utilities alike. A
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) report, cited by the
California Commission in its decision requiring a securities opinion,
described uncertainty about whether community solar will be regulated as a
security as a “top concern” among community solar stakeholders.114 A 2009
legal memorandum to NREL from the Stoel Rives law firm illustrates the
root of that uncertainty.115 Although the memorandum provides
recommendations on how to minimize the risk that community solar
111. See PUC Adopted Program Framework, supra note 76, at 109 (“The commission notes that
this [securities issue] is an area of some uncertainty nationally . . . .”); Decision 17-07-007, supra note
107, at 7 (“Hence, considering the uncertainties around the applicability of securities law, we will not
completely eliminate the securities option requirement at this time.”). The Hawaiʻi Commission noted
its limited authority on this securities issue, gave the utilities latitude to limit their role in an online
platform that would identify all community solar projects available—to address the utilities’ concerns
that the utilities would become “broker[s]” of unregistered securities—and asserted that its program
design includes a “robust set of consumer protection mechanisms with an eye toward mitigating
potential securities risks.” PUC Adopted Program Framework, supra note 76, at 109–12.
112. See supra Part I.C (describing the potential energy justice benefits of community solar).
113. See, e.g., Decision 17-07-007, supra note 107, at 2 (noting that the Commission
“acknowledged the parties’ concern regarding the cost of this requirement”); NREL, SHARED SOLAR,
supra note 96, at 14 (“The legal determination itself [regarding whether a community solar interest is a
security] may consume significant resources.”); cf. James S. Mofsky, Some Comments on the Expanding
Definition of Security, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 395 (1973) (“A threshold question to securities
lawyers and their clients is whether a particular scheme of financing will be deemed a security. If so, it
is subject to the costly registration provisions of the law if offered for sale but not exempt from
registration.”).
114. NREL, SHARED SOLAR, supra note 96, at vi (“One of the top concerns raised by shared
solar stakeholders is uncertainty about the applicability of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
requirements for registration and disclosure of shared solar projects.”).
115. Stoel Rives Memorandum, supra note 96, at 2, 6–10 (“This memorandum is intended to set
forth some of the key factors that the courts tend to use and our general recommendations on structuring
those factors in an effort to minimize the likelihood that a security exists. Ultimately, each situation will
have to be judged on its specific facts using the factors and principles described above.”).
800 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 43:777
projects involve a security,116 it also explains that there is “no bright line
test to determine whether a [community solar] contract is a security,” and
asserts that each circumstance should be considered individually.117
Over the past century, securities laws have been the subject of a variety
of criticisms.118 Community solar illuminates a new one: uncertainty about
whether it will be regulated as a security systemically tilts in favor of dated
utility models and away from new models of community energy innovation.
To illustrate, consider that the Hawaiian Electric Companies are owned by a
publicly traded holding company.119 Like many other electric utilities, they
are intimately familiar with securities regulation, and have institutional
mechanisms to ensure compliance.120 Community groups and community
solar developers typically do not.121 Securities insecurity122 therefore poses
substantially less burden to utility-led community solar projects and models
compared to community-led projects.123 Energy justice principles demand
that we more closely evaluate the source of this regulatory uncertainty.
116. Id. at 6–9.
117. Id. at 2, 10.
118. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Fifty Years of Securities Regulation in Search of a Purpose, 21
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 257, 272–73 (1984) (describing a number of criticisms of federal securities
regulation); Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Role of Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the JOBS Act, 66
DUKE L.J. 605, 606 (2016) [hereinafter Campbell, Blue Sky Laws] (arguing that state securities laws
have been an impediment to efficient movement of capital, “felt most acutely in regard to small-
business”).
119. See Hawaiian Electric Industries Inc., MARKET WATCH, https://www.marketwatch.com/
investing/stock/he (last visited Apr. 27, 2019) (providing the latest price of HEI stock).
120. Cf. George J. Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required
Disclosure SEC and FTC Requirements, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 30, 34 (1977) (“In general,
though, once a corporation has adapted its records to the SEC’s requirements, the additional direct cost
of filling in the periodic report forms may not be very great . . . . However, the relative burden on
smaller corporations is most likely much greater and may be quite onerous.”).
121. See generally Robert G. O’Connor et al., Securities Law 101 for Community Solar Market
Participants – Orange Groves, Country Clubs, and Solar Condos, ENERGY TODAY,
https://www.energytoday.net/economics-policy/policies/securities-law-101-community-solar-market-
participants-orange-groves-country-clubs-solar-condos/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2019) (asserting that
“[s]ome community solar market participants may decide to pursue a strategy to mitigate the risk of
securities liability by seeking an SEC no-action letter with respect to their particular set of facts or by
obtaining an opinion of legal counsel, but often these strategies are impractical because of the delays
and costs involved”).
122. Bailey, supra note 94.
123. O’Connor et al., supra note 121 (recommending that “[p]arties that intend to develop or
participate in a community solar offering should consult with legal counsel having expertise in these
matters to discuss the facts and circumstances of the particular community solar offering and to develop
a strategy to navigate the potential applicability of state and federal securities regulatory regimes to the
offering”).
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III. WHAT IS A SECURITY?
For several reasons, Hawaiʻi offers a suitable policy test bed in which
to take a closer look at community solar and securities. First, the State’s
recently approved community solar program offers a specific framework of
facts and circumstances under which the applicability of securities laws can
be examined.124
Second, unlike the CommunitySun no-action letter, the Vermont
exemption, the Colorado opinion letter, and several other analyses,125
community solar in Hawaiʻi may need to heed two tests for defining an
investment contract for the purpose of securities laws: (1) federal law
applying the Howey126 test, also utilized by a majority of states; and (2) the
State’s blue sky laws,127 applying the minority risk capital test.128 Six of at
least eighteen states with community solar legislation or regulation have
adopted the risk capital test.129 But the test has not been the focus of
discussion on community solar and securities to date. Furthermore, the risk
capital test is sometimes characterized as broader than the federal test, and
therefore more likely to implicate community solar as a security.130
124. See Nohara Letter, supra note 103 (noting the need for a fact-specific inquiry).
125. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
126. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
127. The phrase blue sky laws describes state securities laws. See, e.g., State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920) (“It has been said that its popular name [blue sky law]
indicates the evil at which it is aimed, that is, speculative schemes having no more basis than so many
feet of blue sky.” (first citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 549 (1917); then citing State v. Agey,
88 S.E. 726 (N.C. 1916))).
128. See, e.g., Haw. Comm’r of Sec. v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 110–11 (Haw. 1971)
(applying the risk capital test).
129. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1, 13 & n.13 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)
(identifying various states adopting the risk capital test by decision, rule, or statute); JEFFREY J. COOK &
MONISHA SHAH, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FOCUSING THE SUN: STATE CONSIDERATIONS FOR
DESIGNING COMMUNITY SOLAR POLICY app. A (2018), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/70663.pdf
(summarizing community solar legislation or regulation in eighteen states).
130. See Nohara Letter, supra note 103 (asserting that “analysis of an investment contract in a
jurisdiction following Hawaii Market Center will be broader . . . than in jurisdictions that follow
Howey”); HECO Comments on Second PUC Proposal, supra note 87, at 33 (arguing that “it’s entirely
possible that [community solar] programs developed in other jurisdictions may indeed be ‘securities’
under the broader Hawaii test”); see also Michael E. Stevenson & John J. O’Leary III, Definition of a
Security: Risk Capital and Investment Contracts in Washington, 3 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 83, 83–84
(1979) (describing Washington’s adoption of the risk capital test as “expand[ing] the applicability of the
securities act to reach financing schemes that heretofore were unregulated”). Not all analyses agree that
the risk capital test is broader than the Howey test. See, e.g., Stanley v. Commercial Courier Serv., Inc.,
411 F. Supp. 818, 823 (D. Or. 1975) (acknowledging that the tests are not “synonymous” but concluding
that they are “essentially the same”); Brewer, 932 S.W.2d at 13 (rejecting appellant’s contention that
“the test in [Hawaiʻi] Market is far broader than the Howey–Forman formula”).
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Third, Hawaiʻi was a leading adopter of the risk capital test, creating
the frequently cited Hawaii Market Center formulation in 1971.131
A. Economic Reality and Investment Contracts as Securities
The threshold question of what is regulated as a security has a long
history, in an astonishingly wide variety of transactional contexts.132 The
contours of that history have been extensively covered and discussed
elsewhere.133 The following summary is not intended to re-convey the
131. Hawaii Market Center, 485 P.2d at 105, 109.
132. The following list illustrates a sampling of the analyses and contexts in which the definition
of a security has been considered: Rutherford B. Campbell Jr., Stallion Syndicates as Securities, 70 KY.
L.J. 1131, 1158 (1981); William J. Carney, Defining A Security: The Addition of A Market-Oriented
Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311, 358–59 (1984) (discussing,
for example, insurance policies); James D. Gordon III, Flying into Blue Sky: Aircraft Leasebacks As
Securities, 35 UCLA L. REV. 779 (1988); James D. Gordon III, Essay, Interplanetary Intelligence About
Promissory Notes As Securities, 69 TEX. L. REV. 383, 384 (1990) (including this amusing exchange
between hypothetical interplanetary aliens: “Monset: Do you mean that even though the Acts say ‘any
note’ is a security, they don’t mean that? Zoron: That’s correct. For example, the promissory notes that
accompany home mortgages are not securities. Monset: This news is going to make a lot of homeowners
on [planet] Zerix happy.”); Thomas Lee Hazen, Taking Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held
Corporations: When Is Stock Not A Security, 61 N.C. L. REV. 393, 386–98 (1983); Wayne Klein,
Certificates of Deposit As Securities: State Law Considerations, 5 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 55, 60, 78–
79, 85–86 (1986); Joseph C. Long, The Naked Commodity Option Contract as a Security, 15 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211, 213–17 (1973); Peter A. MacLaren, Securities Law – Profits in Paradise: When
Resort Condominiums Qualify as Investment Contracts, 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 177, 180–86,
190–94 (1989); Joan MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (A Security): Funding for-Profit Social
Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 311–13, 315, 317 (2013); Ellen R. Peirce & Richard A. Mann,
Time-Share Interests in Real Estate: A Critical Evaluation of the Regulatory Environment, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 9, 26, 30–34 (1983); R. K. Pezold & Danny P. Richey, The ‘Industry Deal’ Among Oil
and Gas Companies and the Federal Securities Acts, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV. 827, 840–45 (1985)
(discussing undivided fractional interests in oil and gas leases); Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability
Company Interests Securities, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1069, 1102 (1992); Jeffrey Allen Tew & David
Freedman, In Support of SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the
Economic Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 407, 422 (1973) (discussing contexts such as partnerships, joint ventures, and cemetery plots);
Richard A. Barasch, Comment, Interest in Pension Plans As Securities: Daniel v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 184, 185 (1978); Note, The Federal Securities Laws and
Employee Pension Participants: Retiring Daniel, 87 YALE L.J. 1666, 1667 (1978); Shanah D. Glick,
Comment, Are Viatical Settlements Securities Within the Regulatory Control of the Securities Act of
1933?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 958 (1993); Securities Acts—Federal Securities Exchange Act—
Withdrawable Capital Accounts in Savings and Loan Association Are Not “Securities” Within Antifraud
Provisions of Section 10(b)—Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374 (7th Cir), cert. granted, 387 U.S. 941
(1967), 81 HARV. L. REV. 495, 498 (1967).
133. The seminal treatise by Professor Louis Loss (now with Professor Joel Seligman and
Professor Troy Paredes) is one particularly helpful resource. See generally LOUIS LOSS ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1–111, 387–487 (7th ed. 2018) (overviewing a history of
securities regulation). Other sources for insightful summaries, histories, or analyses from various
perspectives include: Douglas M. Branson & Karl Shumpei Okamoto, The Supreme Court’s Literalism
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entirety of that background. Rather, it is intended to provide some
additional historical context for the early history of this issue and to orient
readers who may be arriving at this issue from the perspective of utility
regulation or energy justice, rather than from a securities background.
State and federal securities laws define a “security” in famously broad
terms:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based
swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.134
During decades of uncertainty over what is, and is not, a security, this
laundry list and undefined catchall provisions like “investment contract”
and in general, “any interest or instrument commonly known as a security”
have been the subject of much debate and hand-wringing.135
and the Definition of Security in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1092 (1993);
Williamson B. C. Chang, Meaning, Reference, and Reification in the Definition of a Security, 19 U.C.
DAVIS L. Rev. 403, 457–60 (1986); J. Thomas Hannan & William E. Thomas, The Importance of
Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1974); Homer
Kripke, supra note 118; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 347 passim (1991); Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing
Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 231–33 (2003); Mofsky, supra note 113; Gary S. Rosin, Historical
Perspectives on the Definition of A Security, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 575 (1987) (commenting on the
legislative history of the Act); Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the
Definition of Security: The Context Clause, Investment Contract Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40
VAND. L. REV. 489 (1987) (exploring the meaning of a security in Supreme Court jurisprudence);
Stevenson & O’Leary, supra note 130.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (Supp. 2018); see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (Supp. 2018)
(defining a security in similar terms as section 77b(a)(1)); HAW. REV. STAT. § 485A-102 (Supp. 2017)
(defining “security” in terms very similar to the federal statutes).
135. See, e.g., Mofsky, supra note 113, at 396–97 (“The problem is not with such standard
instruments as stocks, bonds, debentures, or notes, for they are readily identifiable as securities. Rather,
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Of course, a community solar project could, theoretically, be developed
in a way that clearly renders it a security. For example, interests in the
project could be offered in the form of stock in the project’s corporate
owner. That corporate owner could generate revenue via a power purchase
agreement with a utility. The corporate owner’s profits and capital could be
returned to stockholders in the form of dividends and appreciation. As
“stock,” this would be likely to fall within the securities definition136 and
would need to be registered137 or qualify for an exemption from
registration.138
More realistically, this is not how community solar programs are
intended to operate, particularly where they are implemented as a tariff
overseen by a public utilities regulator. Thus, the question of whether
community solar is a security is couched in terms of whether participation
in a project falls within the catchall concept of an investment contract.
1. A Closer Look at Gopher Tire & Rubber Co. and the Birth of Investment
Contracts as Securities
The concept of investment contracts as securities predates the Federal
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934; the concepts was incorporated into
Minnesota securities legislation in 1917.139 In 1920, the Minnesota Supreme
Court first analyzed the phrase in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.140 For
$50, the defendant tire manufacturer sold certificates appointing “the holder
the difficulty arises with the more ingenious devices that do not clearly come within the purview of the
orthodox terminology. To be more specific, the problem stems from the way courts and regulators
define the terms ‘investment contract,’ . . . and ‘any interest or instrument commonly known as a
security.’”). Note that the phrase “investment contract” has developed into the operative catchall for this
definition. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (stating that “[w]e
perceive no distinction, for present purposes, between an ‘investment contract’ and an ‘instrument
commonly known as a security’”).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (Supp. 2018) (including “stock” in the definition of a security); see
also, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 485A-102 (Supp. 2017) (including “stock” in the definition of a security).
137. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012) (making it unlawful to sell, in interstate commerce,
“any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security”); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 485A-301 (2017) (“It is unlawful for a person to offer or sell a security in this State unless: (1) The
security is a federal covered security; (2) The security, transaction, or offer is exempted from
registration under sections 485A-201 to 485A-203; or (3) The security is registered under this
chapter.”).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012 & Supp. 2018) (identifying exempt transactions, such as those
covered by Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.500–.508 (2018)); HAW REV. STAT. §§ 485A-201 to -203
(2018) (identifying exempt transactions and securities).
139. See, e.g., Mofsky, supra note 113, at 397 (explaining that “[t]he process all began in 1917
when the Minnesota Legislature incorporated the term ‘investment contract’ in its statute defining
‘security’”).
140. State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920).
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as one of its agents to assist by word of mouth and in other ways in the sale
of tires and tubes.”141 In return, the certificate holders were promised a pro
rata share in the defendant’s proceeds, an annual bonus based on excess
earnings, and a discount on tires and tubes for their own consumption.142
The court utilized a flexible view of a security:
To lay down a hard and fast rule by which to determine whether
that which is offered to a prospective investor is such a security
as may not be sold without a license would be to aid the
unscrupulous in circumventing the law. It is better to determine
in each instance whether a security is in fact of such a character
as fairly to fall within the scope of the statute.143
Applying this instance-by-instance rubric, the court observed that
“[t]he certificates are like stock in that they give their holders the right to
share in the profits of the corporation, but their value is purely speculative,
for their holders get no interest in the tangible assets of the corporation.”144
But rather than finding that the certificates were securities as “stock,” the
court invoked the statutory phrase “investment contract,” and on this basis
determined that the certificates were securities.145
The court defined an investment contract as a contract or scheme for
“[t]he placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure
income or profit from its employment.”146 In the relatively early evolution
of the securities laws, this formulation was recounted and used by a variety
of courts.147 In the subsequent century, at least one author has suggested
141. Id. at 937.
142. Id. at 937–38.
143. Id. at 938.
144. Id.
145. Id. The court summarized the applicable statute as follows:
All persons, firms, and corporations are prohibited from engaging, within this
state, in the business of selling or negotiating for the sale of any stocks, bonds,
investment contracts, or other securities issued by him or it, except securities
specifically enumerated in section 2 of the act. No investment company or dealer
shall sell or offer for sale, or profess the business of selling or offering for sale,
securities coming within the scope of the act, unless and until he or it shall have
furnished to the state securities commission information touching the honesty,
good faith, and character of the business of the company or dealer, and shall have
obtained from the commission a license to sell securities. Violation of any of the
previsions of the act is made a gross misdemeanor.
Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. E.g., SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647, 651 (S.D. Fla. 1941) (applying the federal securities
laws); People v. White, 12 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932); Freeze v. Smith, 236 N.W. 810, 812
(Mich. 1931); Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 161 A. 193, 195 (N.J. Ch. 1932); State v. Heath, 153
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that it may have given birth to the risk capital test for defining a security,
discussed further in Part III.B.148
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach was animated by the stated
purpose of the then-burgeoning blue sky laws, targeting “get-rich-quick”
schemes:
The purpose of the statute is to protect the public against
imposition. It is a new form of regulatory law which, in the
course of a few years, has swept over 33 states. It has been said
that its popular name indicates the evil at which it is aimed, that
is, speculative schemes having no more basis than so many feet
of blue sky, and that it is intended to put a stop to the sale of
shares in visionary oil wells, nonexistent gold mines and other
“get-rich-quick” schemes calculated to despoil credulous
individuals of their savings.149
The court’s reference to “visionary oil wells” reveals an interesting
connection between energy development and securities laws.150 In the
modern definition of a security, “fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights” are expressly included in the definition’s laundry
list.151 The 1917 Minnesota statute utilized more general terms like stocks,
bonds, and investment contracts.152 But when the court considered this
general language, it appears that oil investments were top-of-mind on the
list of speculative schemes to be regulated as securities.153
Oil exploration ignited in the U.S. with the first oil-specific
commercial wells in the mid-1800s.154 In 1887, the Minnesota legislature
S.E. 855, 857 (N.C. 1930); In re Bowen, 49 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1943); Union Land Assocs. v.
Ussher, 149 P.2d 568, 570 (Or. 1944); Brownie Oil Co. of Wis. v. R.R. Comm’n of Wis., 240 N.W. 827,
829 (Wis. 1932).
148. See Joseph C. Long, An Attempt to Return Investment Contracts to the Mainstream of
Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 169 (1971) (arguing that “[i]n the Gopher case there is
language indicating that the court had some idea of the risk capital approach”).
149. Gopher Tire, 177 N.W. at 938 (citations omitted).
150. Id.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (Supp. 2018).
152. Gopher Tire, 177 N.W. at 938.
153. See id (“[The statute] is intended to put a stop to the sale of shares in visionary oil
wells . . . .”).
154. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S.
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 953–54 (2015) (discussing the history and origins of
the U.S. oil industry).
Although many textbooks cite Edw[in] Drake’s 1859 oil strike in Titusville,
Pennsylvania, as the first major development in the modern petroleum industry,
that discovery was not the first, nor was it the first time people
recognized oil’s utility and potential economic value. In 1543, Spanish explorers
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directed the state geologist, N.H. Winchell, to explore for oil, coal, gas, and
other resources.155 Winchell described this legislative act as the result of a
“feverish” response to gas discoveries in Pennsylvania and other states and
a resulting “impulse toward economic geology in Minnesota.”156
By 1889, it was apparently evident to Winchell that much of the
animation around oil and gas exploration in Minnesota was unwarranted.157
found oil floating on the water’s surface on the Texas coast near the present-day
city of Port Arthur, and reported using it to caulk their boats. Records from the
18th and 19th centuries indicate that indigenous peoples and European
missionaries identified and used oil springs in what is now western New York. By
the late 1700s, oil was a recorded object of commerce, sold by the gallon, keg,
and bottle. The expansion of the petroleum industry occurred only once a steady
supply of oil could reach refiners and consumers. The first reliable petroleum
supply was developed in the “Oil Region” of northwestern Pennsylvania,
beginning with Drake’s well at Titusville in 1859. By the end of 1860 there were
74 oil wells along nearby Oil Creek, a tributary to the Allegheny River, and it was
estimated that a total of 200,000 barrels of oil had been produced up to that point.
Id.
155. See MINN. STAT. § 226 (1887); see also G.B. Morey, The Search for Oil and Gas in
Minnesota, MINN. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY EDUCATIONAL SERIES-6, 1984, at 1, 20,
https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/57260/MGS_ES_6.pdf (describing Winchell’s
responsibilities). To illustrate the activity surrounding oil and gas at this time, consider that 1887 was
also the year that Standard Oil Company filed articles of incorporation in Minnesota. STATE OF MINN.,
ANN. REP. OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE TO THE LEGIS. OF MINN. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JULY 31,
1887, at 16 [hereinafter MINN. LEGIS. REP., 1887]. Standard Oil was the predecessor to modern oil giants
such as Exxon and Chevron. It grew into a behemoth that U.S. President and, later, Supreme Court
Justice William Howard Taft described as “the greatest monopoly . . . in the world” and “one of the
chief reasons” for U.S. anti-trust legislation. Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust
Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 609 (2012) (quoting WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-
TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 85 (1914)). The company created the infamous riches of John
Rockefeller. See generally id. at 609–11 (describing Rockefeller and the rise of Standard Oil). To
illustrate how much the world has changed, consider that the Rockefeller family fortune garnered global
attention in 2014 by announcing its plan to divest from fossil fuel investments. See Fossil Fuel
Divestment, ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND, https://www.rbf.org/about/divestment (last visited Apr.
27, 2019).
156. N. H. WINCHELL, GEOLOGICAL & NAT. HISTORY SURVEY OF MINN., NATURAL GAS IN
MINNESOTA 3–4 (1889).
The great discoveries of gas in Pennsylvania and more recently in Ohio and
Indiana, and in other places in the United States, have had their natural effect in
Minnesota. They have caused a feverish and sometimes an expressed feeling of
unrest, and of curiosity to know what would be the result in case a careful probing
of the earth’s crust were undertaken. . . . This general impulse toward economic
geology in Minnesota resulted in the passage of the following law by the
Legislature of 1887.
Id.
157. See Morey, supra note 155, at 22 (“Already in 1889 it was evident to Winchell that most of
the rock formations that furnish gas in the United States are lacking in Minnesota. Bulletin 5 relates how
Winchell’s geologic conclusions were for the most part ignored by wildcatters.”). After Winchell’s
investigation, the State turned over operation of exploratory machinery to the private Minnesota Gas,
Oil and Fuel Company to explore one potentially promising gas resource. WINCHELL, supra note 156, at
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Despite that, speculative “wildcat” oil exploration continued for at least a
century.158 By the 1920s, reports of finding oil had sparked interest in
various parts of the State, including “periodic reports of striking it rich
using divining rods.”159 Reports like this were part of public consciousness.
After a retired Methodist minister mysteriously found “pure oil and
gasoline” in his water well,160 headlines reported that “Lake Lillian Holds
its Breath” as “Town Awaits Result of the Drilling for Oil.”161
Newspapers’ advertisements from this era of Minnesota’s history
further illustrate this “feverish” vision of oil and gas riches. For example:
The Revenue Mining Company touted “The Newest Oil Field”
and asked urged readers to “[b]uy in a company which already
has oil and gas and other rich products ready for the market.
Other companies are selling stock at much more than we are
asking and have no development, only the bare ground . . . . Get
in now and make this profit within the next few days.”162
The Paramount Oil & Gas Company issued a “Special
Announcement To Investors” about a money-back guaranteed
investment. “If You Are Looking for an investment where, at
least, 12 per cent annually and the safety of your principal is
assured, we can serve you. We can, also, show you speculative
possibilities of several hundred per cent that are as sure as
anything can be sure in the oil business.”163
“OIL!” blared Morrison & Company. “One Can Invest Safely in
Oil as Well as Speculate, LET US TELL YOU ABOUT [AN
OIL STOCK] . . . EARNING ITS DIVIDENDS NINE TIMES
OVER REQUIREMENTS. We know of no other preferred stock
having behind it such large equities, great earning power, and
showing such a satisfactory income yield on the investment.”164
13–15. “No natural gas or oil were encountered in commercial quantities.” Morey, supra note 155, at
20.
158. Morey, supra note 155, at 27. “‘Wildcat’ is the term used for exploration ventures in
territory not known to be productive.” Id. at 20.
159. Id. at 22.
160. Id. at 24.
161. Lake Lillian Holds its Breath Town Awaits Result of the Drilling for Oil, BRAINERD DAILY
DISPATCH, Aug. 25, 1926, at 8.
162. Revenue Mining Company, MINNEAPOLIS J., Oct. 2, 1902, at 9.
163. Paramount Oil & Gas Co., Special Announcement to Investors, MINNEAPOLIS SUNDAY
TRIB., Mar. 24, 1918, at 5.
164. Morrison & Co., Oil!, MINNEAPOLIS MORNING TRIB., Sept. 16, 1920, at 17.
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Despite this flurry of oil exploration and interest, Minnesota never
succeeded in developing a commercial fossil-fuel extraction industry.165
Today, stock touts like those above would be likely to run headlong into the
anti-fraud protection afforded by federal and state securities laws. Indeed,
as the oil and gas industry was taking root in Minnesota, the Secretary of
State (commenting on corporations generally) strongly called upon laws to
end the “constant practice” of companies organized with the “sole object of
preying upon the community in order to enrich a few irresponsible
schemers.”166 The prior year, the Secretary of State had noted an “unusually
large” number of new corporations formed in 1886 and 1887, attributed to
165. See Minnesota State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=MN (last updated Apr. 18, 2019) (noting that “Minnesota
has no fossil fuel production”).
Most of the natural gas discoveries in Minnesota were accidental. Many were
spectacular. A few were tragic. Not one was profitable as a commercial venture.
But the incentives are strong, and the search continues. Today, after millions of
dollars have been invested in hundreds of wells, and after 100 years of frustration,
what have Minnesotans learned? Not nearly enough is the answer that this history
would suggest.
Morey, supra note 155, at 1.
166. STATE OF MINN., ANN. REP. OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE TO THE LEGIS. OF MINN. FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JULY 31, 1888, at 70–71.
Another matter of still greater importance is the well known fact that under our
present statutes, companies can be organized and legalized with the sole object of
preying upon the community in order to enrich a few irresponsible schemers,
whose only capital stock is the sanction which the law gives to their enterprise.
When a corporation receives on its articles a certificate under the great seal of the
state, that it has complied with all the requirements of the law and is authorized to
transact business, ordinary people regard that as a certificate of character for
which the state, to some extent at least, has become responsible; therefore, as our
law now stands it is often the means of deceiving instead of protecting the people,
and this department has had abundant evidence that this evil does not exist in
theory only but in constant practice. There is an obvious and pressing need of
correcting such abuses, so that no corporation which is based upon promises and
undertakings to do certain acts in certain future events, can receive the legal
sanction of the state until it has been subjected to close scrutiny and given ample
guarantee for the fulfillment of its promises.
Id. More broadly, there has been much academic debate about the whether proliferating fraud, or other
factors, drove and shaped the early adoption of securities laws. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note
133, at 348 (identifying “three separate justifications for blue sky laws,” including: “(1) preventing fraud
in the sale of securities; (2) combating market failure arising from informational problems; and (3)
paternalism”); Mahoney, supra note 133, at 249 (concluding that there is a lack of “evidence that the
statutes responded to actual instances of fraud” and that adoption was influenced by lobbying by “broad-
based political movements” and more specific interests, such as small banks); Joel Seligman, The
Historical Need for A Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 18–33 (1983)
(discussing “[p]re-1934 [e]vidence of [c]oncealment or [m]isrepresentation of [m]aterial [i]nvestment
[i]nformation”).
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“the general prosperity of the State, but especially for its mineral and
manufacturing interests.”167
This backdrop of visionary oil wells and irresponsible corporate
schemers may help us understand why the court in Gopher Tire & Rubber
Co. preferred to adopt a securities definition broad enough to catch any
scheme “of such a character as fairly to fall within the scope of the statute,”
rather than identify a sharper line.168 That flexible approach—seeking out
the underlying economic reality of a transaction rather than applying a
tightly bounded legal test—remains with us in today’s treatment of the term
“security.”169
2. A Brief Summary of Investment Contracts Under Federal Law
Minnesota’s is not the only example of intersection between the energy
sector and the development of securities laws. In 1887 Congress passed the
Interstate Commerce Act, making railroads the first federally regulated
industry.170 In 1907, the resulting Interstate Commerce Commission
recommended amendments to the Act that would require common carriers
to receive approval before issuing securities.171 This recommendation was
adopted in 1920, marking the first instance of permanent federal securities
legislation.172 The same year, the Federal Water Power Act pulled another
regulated industry—power utilities—into the world of federal securities
regulation.173
Outside of the public utilities realm, the energy industry continued to
play a role in defining investment contracts. In 1943, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered in SEC v. Joiner whether an offer of small undivided oil
and gas leasehold interests across a 3000-acre tract in Texas involved the
sale of securities.174 The defendant argued that because the statutory
167. MINN. LEGIS. REP., 1887, supra note 155, at 5.
168. State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920).
169. See infra notes 213–18 and accompanying text.
170. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); see generally Thomas W. Merrill,
The Interstate Commerce Act, Administered Contracts, and the Illusion of Comprehensive Regulation,
95 MARQ. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (2012) (describing the genesis of the Interstate Commerce Act).
171. LOSS ET AL., supra note 133, at 49. State regulation of securities issued by public utilities
began earlier, in the early 1900s. Id. at 33.
172. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 164 (3d ed. 1998).
173. Id. at 914.
174. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 345–46 (1943). Gopher Tire and Joiner
are not the only examples of the definition of a security intersecting with the energy sector. Professor
Joseph Long has argued that the risk capital test was first conceived in the context of financing gas
station constructions during the 1920s. See Long, supra note 148, at 169 n.153 (discussing Brownie Oil
Co. of Wis. v. R.R. Comm’n of Wis., 240 N.W. 827 (1932) and asserting that the relevant financing
“was a common means of financing gas station construction during the 1920’s”).
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definition of a security expressly included a “fractional undivided interest in
oil, gas or other mineral rights,” it excluded the sale of undivided
leaseholds.175 The Court invoked the concept of an investment contract, and
looked at the underlying economic “thread” of the transaction, to reach the
conclusion that the leaseholds were indeed securities:
Undisputed facts seem to us however to establish the conclusion
that defendants were not as a practical matter offering naked
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration
well it would have been a quite different proposition.
. . .
But defendants offered no such dismal prospect. Their
proposition was to sell documents which offered the purchaser a
chance, without undue delay or additional cost, of sharing in
discovery values which might follow a current exploration
enterprise. The drilling of this well was not an unconnected or
uncontrolled phenomenon to which salesmen pointed merely to
show the possibilities of the offered leases. The exploration
enterprise was woven into these leaseholds in both an economic
and a legal sense; the undertaking to drill a well runs through the
whole transaction as the thread on which everybody’s beads
were strung.
. . .
It is clear that an economic interest in this well-drilling
undertaking was what brought into being the instruments that
defendants were selling and gave to the instruments most of their
value and all of their lure. The trading in these documents had all
the evils inherent in the securities transactions which it was the
aim of the Securities Act to end.176
Three years later, the Court developed the still-dominant federal test
for determining whether a transaction involves an investment contract.177
175. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 344–49, 352 (“It is urged that because the [securities] definition
mentions ‘fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,’ it excludes sales of leasehold
subdivisions by parcels.”).
176. Id. at 348–49 (emphasis added).
177. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
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SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. did not involve the energy industry.178 Rather, the
Court evaluated a scheme in which a citrus farmer offered to sell grove
acreage to prospective customers.179 Purchasers were also offered—and
typically accepted—a service contract under which the citrus farmer
harvested and marketed the crops on the customers’ behalf.180 “Many of
these purchasers [were] patrons of a resort hotel owned . . . by the [citrus
farmer],” where sales talks were given to interested hotel guests.181
Citing Gopher Tire & Rubber, the Court explained that “[f]orm was
disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon economic reality”
when evaluating whether an instrument was an investment contract.182 For
this evaluation, the Howey court formulated a four-part test: “[A]n
investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person”:
(1) “invests his money”
(2) “in a common enterprise and”
(3) “is led to expect profits”
(4) “solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party.”183
Although the Joiner decision did not adopt a formula for the
investment contract inquiry, Howey explained that the new definition
“necessarily underlies this Court’s decision in [Joiner].”184 Applying this
test to the citrus grove contracts, the Court held that they:
[C]learly involve[d] investment contracts as so defined [because
the transaction offered] . . . something more than fee simple
interests in the land, [and] something different from a farm or
orchard coupled with management services. They are offering an
opportunity to contribute money and to share in the profits of a
large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned by
respondents. A common enterprise managed by respondents or
third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore
178. See id. at 294 (“This case involves . . . a citrus grove development . . . .”).
179. Id. at 295.
180. See id. (“Each prospective customer is offered both a land sales contract and a service
contract, after having been told that it is not feasible to invest in a grove unless service arrangements are
made.”).
181. Id. at 296–97.
182. Id. at 298 (citing State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)).
183. Id. at 298–99.
184. Id. at 299 (citing SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943)).
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essential if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a
return on their investments.185
Underscoring the Court’s focus on the economic reality of a
transaction, the Howey decision concluded with: “The statutory policy of
affording broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic
and irrelevant formulae.”186 The legacy of Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.’s
decision not to tightly bound the definition of a security lives on in Howey’s
assertion that its four-part test “embodies a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others
on the promise of profits.”187
B. The Rise of the Risk Capital Test as a New Method to Probe Economic
Reality
The Howey test did not prove to be quite as flexible as intended. In
1961, the California Supreme Court composed a different test in Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski.188 Testing the boundaries of the profit element in
the Howey test and discussion, Silver Hills concerned the sale of
memberships sold to finance the development of a for-profit country
club.189 Purchasers received the right to use the club facilities, but not the
right to share in the club’s assets or profits.190 The court held that the
memberships were securities as “beneficial interest[s] in title to property,”
which was one of the enumerated categories of securities under the
California statute.191 Rather than profit, the court focused on the concept of
“risk capital”: “[the statute’s] objective is to afford those who risk their
capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate
ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or
another.”192
Reminiscent of Joiner’s explanation that the oil and gas interests were
more than naked leasehold interests, and Howey’s explanation that the
185. Id. at 299–300.
186. Id. at 301.
187. Id. at 299.
188. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908 (Cal. 1961).
189. Id. at 906–07.
190. Id. at 907.
191. See id. at 908 (“The purchaser of a membership in the present case has a contractual right
to use the club facilities that cannot be revoked except for his own misbehavior or failure to pay dues.
Such an irrevocable right qualifies as a beneficial interest in title to property within the literal language
of subsection (a) of section 25008.”).
192. Id. at 908–09.
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orange farmer was selling more than a fee simple interest in land, Silver
Hills grounded its holding in the court’s view of the economic reality of the
transaction:
We have here nothing like the ordinary sale of a right to use
existing facilities. Petitioners are soliciting the risk capital with
which to develop a business for profit. The purchaser’s risk is not
lessened merely because the interest he purchases is labelled a
membership. Only because he risks his capital along with other
purchasers can there be any chance that the benefits of club
membership will materialize.193
In 1974, the California Supreme Court underscored this focus on risk,
this time in the context of a purported “investment contract.”194 In Hamilton
Jewelers v. Department of Corporations, the court held that a jeweler’s
offer to sell diamonds for $500, in conjunction with a promise of a 5%
return on the investment, was not a security because the purchase price was
no greater than the value of the diamond at the time of purchase.195 “The
customer, being adequately secured, would have placed no ‘risk capital’”
with the jeweler.196
Shifting the focus from profit to risk, this risk capital approach appears
to be a deviation from the Howey test.197 Indeed, Howey expressly rejected
speculative risk as a determinative factor:
We reject the suggestion of the Circuit Court of Appeals . . . that
an investment contract is necessarily missing where the
enterprise is not speculative or promotional in character and
where the tangible interest which is sold has intrinsic value
independent of the success of the enterprise as a whole. The test
is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others. If that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the
enterprise is speculative or non-speculative, or whether there is a
sale of property with or without intrinsic value.198
193. Id. at 908.
194. Hamilton Jewelers v. Dep’t of Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
195. Id. at 336.
196. Id.
197. But see Hannan & Thomas, supra note 133, at 246–47 n.110 (arguing that the Howey and
risk capital tests are not analytically distinct based on the concept of risk).
198. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
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C. Hawaii Market Center
In 1971, Hawaiʻi became the third state to adopt the risk capital test, in
Hawaii Commissioner of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center.199 The case
concerned a marketing scheme wherein up to 5,000 people could become
“founder-member distributor[s]” of an enterprise aiming to open a
members-only retail store, by purchasing a sewing machine or a cookware
set for more than four times the wholesale value.200 A “distributor” could
upgrade to a “supervisor” by purchasing both the sewing machine and the
cookware.201 The purchaser also executed a contract stating that the
founder-member-distributors/supervisors could earn money via
mechanisms such as commissions (on sales in the yet-to-be developed retail
store) and referral fees (for recruiting or “upgrading” participants).202
The court evaluated whether this somewhat complicated system,
stamped with the hallmarks of a pyramid scheme, was an investment
contract.203 Arguing for the application of the Howey test, the defendant
argued that the scheme did not involve an investment contract because
members did not “expect profits solely from the efforts of others,” Howey’s
fourth element.204 This argument had succeeded in freeing “Market Center”
schemes from blue sky laws in other states.205
Rejecting the “polemics” of the Howey formula’s focus on a “narrow
concept of investor participation,” and reciting Gopher Tire & Rubber’s
definition of an investment contract, the court sought to focus on the
“economic realities of security transactions.”206 Much like Howey had
expressed a formula for evaluating investment contracts after Joiner did
199. See Haw. Comm’r of Sec. v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 110–11 (Haw. 1971)
(deciding the case roughly two months after Oregon became the second state to adopt the risk capital
test); Oregon ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Bus. Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549, 552, 554 (Or. Ct. App. 1971)
(adopting the risk capital test and discussing how Oregon is the second state to adopt the test); Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P. 2d 906, 908–09 (Cal. 1961) (pronouncing the first version of the
risk capital test).
200. Hawaii Market Center, 485 P.2d at 107.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 108.
204. Id.
205. See Gallion v. Ala. Mkt. Ctrs., Inc., 213 So. 2d 841, 846 (Ala. 1968) (concluding “that the
founders contracts involved here are not investment contracts under the Alabama Securities Act”); Ga.
Mkt. Ctrs., Inc. v. Fortson, 171 S.E.2d 620, 624 (Ga. 1969). In Florida, however, a similar scheme was
deemed a security by an appellate court as an “‘interest[] in or under a profit-sharing or participation
agreement or scheme’ within the meaning of” Florida’s blue sky law.” Fla. Disc. Ctrs., Inc. v. Antinori,
226 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.02(1) (1967)).
206. Hawaii Market Center, 485 P.2d at 108–09.
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not, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court adopted the risk capital approach by
deploying an enumerated test:
[A]n investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the
enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror’s
promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable
understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and
above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the
operation of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and
actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.207
The court attributed this formula to Professor Ronald Coffey, proposed
“in his excellent article analysing the essential economic characteristics of
security transactions.”208 Applying its new risk capital formula, the court
found that the scheme was an investment contract.209 On the first element
(initial value) the court explained that the founder-member purchases were
not simple merchandise purchases.210 Instead, the founder-members had
paid a substantial premium for the right to receive future income.211
Quoting Joiner’s rationale “[t]he success of the plan is the common ‘thread
on which everybody’s beads [are] strung,’” the court held that “[t]hese
overcharges constitute the offerees’ investments or contributions of initial
value, such value being subjected to the risks of the enterprise.”212
On the third element (valuable benefit), the court rejected the
defendant’s argument that the founder-member’s expectations were based
on the promise of commissions rather than a share in the enterprise’s
207. Id. at 109.
208. Id. at 109 n.5 (citing Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a Security: Is There a
More Meaningful Formula, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367, 413 (1967)).
209. Id. at 111.
210. Id. at 110.
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943)) (second
alteration in original).
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profits, and therefore the transaction lacked an essential profit element.213
Again citing the Joiner decision and the concept of “economic realities,”
the court explained that “the fact that in the instant case [Hawaii Market
Center] guaranteed the offerees amounts of money independent of
enterprise profits does not undermine the investment nature of the
transactions.”214
On the fourth element (right to exercise managerial control), the court
discounted founder-member participation in the enterprise as “minor.”215
Citing Coffey’s work, the court explained the need to focus on the quality
of the participation.216 In order to negate the finding of a security, the
offeree should have practical and actual control over the managerial
decisions of the enterprise.217 For it is this control which gives the offeree
the opportunity to safeguard his own investment, thus obviating the need
for state intervention.218
Finding that the founder-members were “powerless” to protect their
original investment because they possessed “none of the incidents of
managerial control which would preclude the finding of a security,” the
court held that under the economic realities approach the founder-member
agreements were investment contracts.219
Several months later, the SEC endorsed the Hawaii Market Center test
in the context of multi-level distributorships and pyramid schemes, noting
that the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court had “embrac[ed] interpretive principles of
the kind laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Howey and Joiner” and
opining that the “court’s analysis of the investment-contract concept in the
Hawaii Market Center case is equally applicable under the Federal
securities laws.”220
Despite this pronouncement from the SEC, the risk capital test has not
supplanted the Howey test in the federal courts. It remains the minority test,
adopted by statute, rule, or decision in at least seventeen jurisdictions.221
213. See id. (rejecting the defendant’s narrow definition of profits to find that the transaction
did, in fact, include the profit element).
214. Id. (citing Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1961)).
215. Id. at 109, 111.
216. Id. at 111 (citing Coffey, supra note 208).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. The court explained that managerial control sufficient to escape the fourth element
would include the “power to influence the utilization of accumulated capital” or “authority over
decisions which will affect the operation of the store.” Id.
220. Multi-Level Distributorships and Pyramid Sales Plans, Securities Act Release No. 5211,
Exchange Act Release No. 9387, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 1048 (Nov. 30, 1971).
221. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1, 13 & n.13 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (“From
our review of the case law of other jurisdictions, it appears that the Howey–Forman test is the majority
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Nonetheless, in 1975’s decision in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to bend the Howey test toward
Hawaii Market Center.222 Finding that cooperative housing residents who
had purchased stock in a cooperative housing corporation had purchased
neither “stock” nor an “investment contract” within the meaning of the
securities definition, the Court once again reiterated that the definition is
focused on the economic realities of the transaction.223
Apparently realizing that its earlier pronouncement was too rigid, the
Court undertook to refine the Howey test.224 To this end, the Court stated
that “[t]he touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”225 “This language
effectively deleted the strict ‘solely’ requirement from the [Howey] test in
much the same manner as the [Hawaiʻi] Supreme Court did.”226
In the ensuing decades, the Hawaii Market Center formulation has
been frequently cited in reference to its formulation of the risk capital
test.227 In 2006, the formula was codified in Hawaiʻi’s version of the
Uniform Securities Act.228
IV. EXPLORING THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF COMMUNITY SOLAR—NOT A
SECURITY
The foregoing summary of the investment contract analysis highlights
its most important thread, which survived from Gopher Tire & Rubber all
rule in the United States. However, the definition pronounced in Hawaii Market is also not without
support. Its combined Howey-risk capital test, or forms substantially similar thereto, has been adopted
by at least seventeen jurisdictions. In his treatise on state securities laws, Professor Long states that ‘it is
arguable that this test will eventually replace Howey[-Forman] as the leading test for investment
contracts, at least at the state level.’” (quoting Joseph C. Long, Blue Sky Law § 2.04(4), at 2–146 (1992))
(alteration in original)).
222. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 841–43 (1975).
223. Id. at 851, 859–60.
224. Hawaii Market Center, 485 P.2d at 108–09.
225. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added).
226. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d at 12 (quoting Forman, 421 U.S. at 852).
227. See id. at 12–13 (noting that “the definition pronounced in Hawaii Market is also not
without support. Its combined Howey-risk capital test, or forms substantially similar thereto, has been
adopted by at least seventeen jurisdictions”).
228. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 485A-102 (Supp. 2017) (“‘Security’ . . . [i]ncludes any contractual
or quasi-contractual arrangement pursuant to which: (A) A person furnishes value, other than services,
to an offeror; (B) A portion of that value is subjected to the risk of the offeror’s enterprise; (C) The
furnishing of that value is induced by the representations of an offeror which give rise to a reasonable
understanding that a valuable benefit will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the
enterprise; and (D) The offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over
the management of the enterprise in a meaningful way . . . .”).
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the way through to today’s statutory definition in Hawaiʻi: transactions
must be analyzed by focusing on their “economic realit[ies].”229 Whether
using the risk capital test or the Howey test, we are admonished not to apply
the legal tests mechanically and we are warned against “unrealistic and
irrelevant formulae.”230 Indeed, the genesis of the Hawaii Market Center
test was in Professor Coffey’s attempt—“with some trepidation”—to create
the risk capital test as “a more complete and reliable shorthand description
of the of the economic realities underlying the ‘security’ concept.”231
Coffey joined the chorus in calling out “the problems created when courts
and administrative agencies become too enamored of neat formulas handed
down from prior opinions and fail to focus on the essential economic
considerations relevant to identifying a security.”232
A. Applying the Risk Capital Test to Community Solar
In Coffey’s description, the general approach to identifying a security
involves the following master question as a starting point: “What
characteristics or features of [the] transaction necessitate its being subject to
the rather specialized anti-fraud protection afforded by the securities
laws?”233 More specifically, Coffey created the risk capital test based on his
contention that “risk to initial investment, though not determinative, is the
single most important economic characteristic which distinguishes a
security from the universe of other transactions.”234
Although this focus on risk is not outwardly embraced by the Howey
test, risk has undeniably been an important component of the investment
contract analysis since its inception; consider again Gopher Tire & Rubber
Co.’s illustrative list of “visionary oil wells, nonexistent gold mines, and
other ‘get-rich-quick’ schemes” as securities in need of regulation.235 Risk
is a fundamental component of economic reality, and economic reality is
the touchstone of the investment contract analysis.236 Through this lens, the
risk capital test is an apt tool for evaluating community solar as a security.
229. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
230. Id. at 301 (“The statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be
thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae.”); see also Haw. Comm’r of Sec. v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr.,
Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971) (“Any formula which purports to guide courts in determining
whether a security exists should recognize this essential reality and be broad enough to fulfill the
remedial purposes of the Securities Act.”).
231. Coffey, supra note 208, at 370.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 376.
234. Id. at 375.
235. State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920).
236. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 133, at 227.
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In the Parts that follow, I attempt to avoid an overly mechanical
application of the four elements of the risk capital test, and instead use each
to understand the economic reality of community solar from the perspective
of participants. I argue that the conclusion that community solar is likely to
be regulated as a security is far less tenable than it might first appear.
1. Initial Value
The first prong of the risk capital test is whether an offeree furnishes
“initial value” to an offeror.237 A rote application of the test to community
solar might conclude that if consumers pay (or agree to pay) an enrollment
fee or deposit for participating in a community solar project, then “initial
value” has been provided.238 Such rote application is incorrect.
In Hawaii Market Center, the court found “initial value” because
participants in the pyramid scheme were overcharged a “substantial
premium[]” for merchandise.239 The premium was “given in consideration
for the right to receive future income from the corporation.”240 Without the
premium, the transaction presumably could have been characterized as a
simple purchase of merchandise, rather than involving risk capital. Indeed,
this is exactly the rationale employed in Hamilton Jewelers to distinguish
its result from Hawaii Market Center.241 Coffey explained that the “fact that
the buyer receives tangible property in return for his value may signal the
need for unusually careful analysis.”242 This statement is conceptually
related to the observation in Forman that “when a purchaser is motivated by
a desire to use or consume the item purchased . . . the securities laws do not
apply.”243
Other perspectives on initial value lead to the same result. The concept
of an offeree providing initial value is analogous to California’s
requirement that a security must involve an offeree providing risk capital to
237. Haw. Comm’r of Sec. v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971).
238. Coffey, supra note 208, at 380–81.
239. Hawaii Market Center, 485 P.2d at 110.
240. Id. (stating that “[t]hese overcharges constitute the offerees’ investments or contributions of
initial value”).
241. Hamilton Jewelers v. Cal. Dep’t Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
(stating that “this case is unlike [Hawaii Market Center], where the sums invested were
disproportionately greater than the wholesale value of the merchandise purchased”).
242. Coffey, supra note 208, at 380–81 (noting that “it by no means precludes the possibility
that the whole transaction constitutes a security,” and rather that the “the question is still whether the
transaction exhibits the ‘economic realities’ of a security”).
243. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852–53 (1975).
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a business enterprise.244 In Moreland v. Department of Corporations, the
California Court of Appeals applied this requirement to the following
scenario: investors agreed to purchase a quantity of gold ore, in conjunction
with a contract whereby the seller would refine the ore and provide the
refined gold to the purchaser.245 The seller intended to use the sale proceeds
“to raise the capital for a new milling and refinery plant.”246 Evaluating the
transaction in a variety of ways, the court concluded that notwithstanding
the seller’s intention to use the proceeds to construct the mill and refinery,
the transaction was fundamentally the sale of a commodity, and not a
security.247 It was not a contribution of risk capital to the seller’s mining
enterprise.248 The court’s reasoning aptly illustrates the danger of
mechanically applying the risk capital elements, pointing out that the
intended use of the sale proceeds appeared to “[s]uperficially” satisfy the
requirement of soliciting risk capital.249 But in economic reality, “every
purchaser of a product from a seller, who reinvests the proceeds of the sale
in his business operations, contributes to a seller’s business capital.”250 That
concept does not transform a transaction from an ordinary sale into a
security.251
Applying the initial value prong in this manner, we find it missing in a
typical community solar transaction. Consumers do not pay a premium for
the solar panels and other equipment in consideration for a later share in
profits from the project. Rather, consumers typically purchase or lease an
ownership interest in some panels, or an interest in a portion of the project’s
power output. Inherently, the future output of those panels defines the value
244. See Moreland v. Cal. Dep’t Corp., 239 Cal. Rptr. 558, 566 (Ct. App. 1987) (“The ‘risk
capital’ test requires a consideration of the following factors: (1) whether funds are being raised for a
business venture or enterprise; (2) whether the transaction is offered indiscriminately to the public at
large; (3) whether the investors are substantially powerless to effect the success of the enterprise; and (4)
whether the investors’ money is substantially at risk because it is inadequately secured.”).
245. Id. at 560. The quantity of refined gold was to be determined by the assayed gold content
of the ore. Id. at 563.





251. See id. (“Notwithstanding, such a contribution is an investment in the purchased product
and not a contribution of risk capital to a business enterprise within the normal scope of securities
regulation. The issue here is whether appellant’s use of the proceeds of sale for the construction of
refining facilities changes the essential transaction from an ordinary sale of a commodity to capital
participation in a business. We hold that it does not.”). Cf. Haw. Comm’r of Sec. v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc.,
485 P.2d 105, 110 (Haw. 1971) (“The salient feature of securities sales is the public solicitation of
venture capital to be used in a business enterprise.”) (citing, for example, Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908 (Cal. 1961)).
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of such an interest, and for community solar that value is realized in the
form of future credits on the consumer’s electricity bill.252 The prospective
nature of this value is fundamental to the operation of solar panels and
electricity; in practice, a consumer cannot purchase a batch of solar-
generated electrons and store them in a closet until they are needed to light
a bulb or power a fridge. The prospective nature of the value is not like a
premium paid for sewing machines in Hawaii Market Center.253 Nor is it
like a premium paid for prospective value—or not—in visionary oil wells.
Rather, it is inherent to the entire concept of solar power generation. This
inherent characteristic cannot reasonably turn all community solar interests
into securities.
2. Risks of the Enterprise
The second prong of the Hawaii Market Center test looks for whether a
portion of the initial value is “subjected to the risks of the enterprise.”254
This risk element is a key factor distinguishing a security from other
transactions.255
Here again, rote application to community solar yields an all-too-easy
conclusion. One can envision a number of scenarios in which a community
solar project might not return value to the participants. It might catch on
fire. The developer might abscond to Tahiti before the project is complete.
The panels might stop functioning. Future electricity prices might fall
substantially in comparison to the cost of participating in community solar.
These risks are like risks involved in everyday life and everyday
commercial transactions.256 They are not like the risks associated with
252. See infra note 273 (describing the community solar bill credit mechanism in Hawai‘i).
253. See infra notes 258–62 and accompanying text (discussing Hawaii Market Center).
254. Hawaii Market Center, 485 P.2d at 109.
255. See Coffey, supra note 208, at 381 (“In the proposed test, one of the most important
economic characteristics of a security is the fact that the buyer's initial investment is somehow,
considering the effects of the entire transaction, subjected to the risks of an enterprise.”); see also
Hannan & Thomas, supra note 133, at 241 (asserting that “in determining whether or not a security is
involved in a particular transaction, analysis of the type, character, and allocation of the risk of loss
provides a reliable barometer”).
256. Cf. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 133, at 242 (“Risk analysis is also helpful in
distinguishing between normal ‘commercial’ risks, which lie outside the purview of the [securities] acts,
and investment type risks, which fall within the definition of the term security. The reality of our market
place is that nearly all businesses ultimately finance themselves by obtaining public f[u]nds through the
sale of goods or services. Whenever some future performance is promised to the customer of an
enterprise, there is the commercial risk that the promisor will not perform or that intervening insolvency
of the promisor will prevent or delay the performance. These types of ‘normal’ commercial risks,
without more, do not shift the principal risk to the customer.”).
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investing in visionary oil wells.257 Nor are they like the risks considered in
Hawaii Market Center.258 That case involved a pyramid scheme.259
Founder-members would recoup their initial investment and earn income
from recruiting others, and perhaps collecting commissions on sales in the
yet-to-be-developed retail store.260 The court observed that the recruitment
scheme increased geometrically and was capped at 5,000 founder-
members.261 Therefore, most founder-members would not be able to collect
sufficient recruitment fees to recoup their investment; their return would be
determined by sales in the store.262 They would receive essentially no return
on their investment if the store was not built: “the security of the founder-
members’ investments is inseparable from the risks of the enterprise.”263
Quoting Joiner, the court reasoned that the “success of the [retail store]
plan is the common ‘thread on which everybody’s beads [are] strung.’”264
This citation to Joiner invites us to even more directly consider the
visionary oil wells scenario. Recall that Joiner involved the sale of
individual mineral leaseholds scattered through a large tract of land.265 The
leaseholds were deemed securities because they were coupled with a
promise to engage in oil exploration—and perhaps more precisely, the
257. Cf. Robert A. Brown, Investing in Oil and Gas Drilling, 16 ALTA. L. REV. 232, 236, 241–
42 (1978) (describing a range of factors involved in creating the “high risk” of investing in the oil and
gas business).
258. See Hawaii Market Center, 485 P.2d at 109 (applying the risk capital test to transactions
“motivated by the need to raise capital to finance the opening of the proposed Hawaii Market Center
store”).
259. See, e.g., Frank M. Hull, Pyramid Marketing Plans and Consumer Protection: State and
Federal Regulation, 21 J. PUB. L. 445, 456–57 (1972) (describing the Hawaii Market Center scenario as
a pyramid scheme).
260. Hawaii Market Center, 485 P.2d at 107.
261. Id. at 110.
The recruitment fee paid to distributors and supervisors, during the pre-
operational phase of the plan, rests upon the promoters’ ability to sell the success
of the plan to prospective members. In addition, those members who choose to
rely solely on the second method of earning income, the payment of commissions
based on sales, receive no return at all on their investment unless the store
functions successfully. This latter point is particularly important because
recruitment of members increases geometrically. Therefore, since membership is
limited to five thousand, a very large percentage of founder-members will be
totally dependent on sales commissions to recover their initial investment plus
income. It is thus apparent that the security of the founder-members’ investments
is inseparable from the risks of the enterprise.
Id.
262. Id. at 107.
263. Id.
264. Id. (quoting SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943)) (alteration in
original).
265. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 345.
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speculative chance that a well on a particular leasehold would strike oil.
This formed the economic “thread” of the transaction.266 The Court even
noted that during the drafting of the federal securities laws, oil and gas
rights “were notorious subjects of speculation and fraud.”267
California’s approach to risk capital again lends additional context. In
Moreland, the court believed that the gold investors were “adequately
secured against the risk [seller] might default in his performance under the
refining contract.”268 Much like the Hawaii Market Center reasoning, the
California court observed that investors did not pay a premium for a future
promise of refined gold.269 Instead, they received a right to receive an
adequate quantity of ore based upon its assayed gold content.270 Even
though the investor’s profitability was not ensured, the court held that the
investment was adequately secured, further cementing the conclusion that
the purchasers did not place risk capital with the seller.271
Any of these threads illustrate that to properly understand the economic
realities of community solar, we must do more than simply identify some
type of risk to community participants. We must more carefully scrutinize
the economic thread underlying community solar and search for insight on
the type, character, and allocation of the risk.272
The success of a community solar project does not depend on
speculation that a well will strike oil, nor on speculation that a retail store
will successfully generate sales. Rather, the common economic thread of
community solar is found in a regulated community solar tariff or program
overseen by a public utilities regulator. Participants typically recoup their
investment via an approved regulatory tariff, specifying the manner in
which participants will receive electric bill credits in proportion to
electricity generated by the solar panels.273 Thus, participants’ risk is
266. Id. at 348.
267. Id. at 352.
268. Moreland v. Dep’t of Corps., 239 Cal. Rptr. 558, 568–69 (Ct. App. 1987).
269. Id. at 569.
270. Id.
271. Id.; see also People v. Figueroa, 715 P.2d 680, 696 (Cal. 1986) (“Thus, for example,
‘where the investor receives adequate collateral, no risk capital is contributed to the managerial efforts
of the promoter and such business transaction does not come within the Corporate Securities Law.’”
(first quoting People v. Schock, 199 Cal. Rptr. 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1984); then citing Hamilton Jewelers
v. Cal. Dep’t Corp., 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390–91 (Ct. App. 1974))).
272. See generally Hannan & Thomas, supra note 133, at 224.
273. See PUC Adopted Framework, supra note 76, at att. A 28 (“The bill credit shall be
calculated as follows: Bill Credit ($) = Bill Credit Rate ($/kWh) x Subscription (Subscriber’s percentage
of total [community solar] Facility capacity) x [community solar facility] Output (actual
monthly . . . output in kWh)”); see also NREL, SHARED SOLAR, supra note 96, at vi (“Electricity
benefits are typically allocated on a capacity or energy-production basis. Participants in capacity-based
programs own, lease, or subscribe to a specified number of panels or a portion of the system and
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fundamentally limited to whether or not the panels will generate electricity.
Through this lens, the pertinent risks are (1) the proposed project might not
be built; and (2) once built, the project will not generate sufficient power.
In Hawaiʻi, an escrow requirement protects participants from the first
risk.274 Pre-development enrollment fees or deposits must be kept in an
escrow account, and will not be released to developers until the project
realizes commercial operation.275 Even without an escrow requirement,
when a community solar participant receives a contractual right to solar
panels or their power output, that right should adequately secure their
interest in the sense utilized in Moreland.276
The risk that a project will not continue generating power is also
mitigated. As a general matter, solar panels have a long lifespan.277 As a
growing body of field data corroborates this durability over longer and
longer lifespans, solar module warranties have increased accordingly; a
typical solar panel warranty can cover 25 years.278 In Hawaiʻi’s community
solar program, the details of such equipment warranties must be disclosed
to participants.279
This functional durability allows our focus to shift to risks associated
with a project developer. In TriVectra v. Ushijima, the Hawaiʻi Supreme
Court affirmed the finding of an investment contract security in part
typically receive electricity or monetary credits in proportion to their share of the project.”). In the
Hawaiʻi regulators’ approach, participants’ risk is further bounded because the bill credit is fixed for the
term of the contracted participation. See PUC Adopted Program Framework, supra note 76, at 81
(explaining that bill “credit rates are fixed for the term of the Standard Contract”).
274. PUC Adopted Framework, supra note 76, at att. A 29.
275. Id. at att. A 28–29 (“[Community solar] [s]ubscribers will be required to enter into an
appropriate [subscriber agreement] with the [community solar] Subscriber Organization. The
Agreement . . . shall contain standard information and provisions that ensure transparency and proper
consumer protection. The Agreement must include, at minimum, the following elements: . . . Use of
escrow account to hold any pre-development enrollment fees or deposits, which will be released to the
Subscriber Organization upon commercial operation . . . .”). This is also relevant to the first prong of the
test, concerning initial value; until the project is actually generating the power promised to the
consumer, no value is provided to the developer, irrespective of whether such value would be viewed as
a premium in the sense of Hawaii Market Center.
276. Other consumer protections are also likely to apply. For example, Hawaiʻi’s community
solar framework requires that when developers apply for the program, they must
“[d]emonstrate/establish financial creditworthiness through posting of a surety bond, a financial
guarantee, a letter of credit, or other sufficient evidence of financial ability to develop the project.” Id. at
att. A 17.
277. See generally D.C. Jordan et al., Photovoltaic Failure and Degradation Modes, 25
PROGRESS IN PHOTOVOLTAICS: RES. APPLICATIONS 318, 324 (2017) (reporting photovoltaic failure rates
in the range of other consumer products, but that their long lifetime makes direct comparison difficult).
278. Cf. D.C. Jordan & S.R. Kurtz, Photovoltaic Degradation Rates—An Analytical Review, 21
PROGRESS IN PHOTOVOLTAICS: RES. APPLICATIONS 12, 16 fig. 4 (2011) (illustrating the evolution of a
“typical” warranty).
279. See PUC Adopted Program Framework, supra note 76, at att. A 26.
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because the participants “could only realize a return if [the seller, a website
operator,] remained viable and sufficiently capitalized to honor
its . . . commitments.”280 But TriVectra, properly viewed, counsels that
community solar is not a security. Once a solar project reaches commercial
operation, it makes little difference whether the original developer remains
viable. While participants will undoubtedly want some entity to conduct
maintenance if necessary and to provide the utility with accounting
information sufficient to allocate energy credits, that function could be
satisfied by any number of entities (including, if necessary and prudent, the
electric utility). In economic reality, the participants’ risk with respect to
the ongoing participation of the original developer is even lower than in
other commercial contexts.
Perhaps because of the durability of a solar project and the fungibility
of its operator, Hawaiʻi’s community solar framework relies largely on a
required consumer disclosure checklist to address the long-term risks of
power production.281 In addition to disclosing equipment warranties and
other information, that checklist requires developers to provide an output
guarantee, including a “[d]efinition of underperformance and a description
of the compensation to be paid by the [community solar developer] for any
underperformance.”282 Buttressing this output guarantee, developers must
also provide: (1) information about the type and level of insurance for the
project, and the insurance benefits that protect participants; (2) proof and
description of a long-term maintenance plan; and (3) assurances that all
installations, upgrades, and repairs will be completed under the direct
supervision of qualified professionals, in accordance with industry
standards and manufacturer recommendations.283 This community solar
process abounds with other disclosures too. For example, agreements
between participants and a developer must include information about the
developer’s identity, the credit rate to be applied to the participant’s bill,
and information about how that credit will be calculated.284
280. See TriVectra v. Ushijima, 144 P.3d 1, 11 (Haw. 2006) (stating that “members could only
realize a return if [the promoter] remained viable and sufficiently capitalized to honor
its . . . commitments” and that “[a]ccordingly, the commissioner was not wrong in concluding that the
members’ initial value investments were subject to the risks of the enterprise”).
281. PUC Adopted Program Framework, supra note 76, at att. A 25–26.
282. Id. at att. A 26.
283. Id. at att. A 25–26.
284. Id. at att. A 29. Hawaiʻi’s community solar framework also mandates that participants will
be allowed to transfer their bill credits from address to address if they move within an electric utility’s
service territory, at no cost to the participant. Id. Transfers from one utility customer to another
customer are also allowed at a price disclosed in the original agreement between the participant and
developer. Id. at att. A 30. Finally, participants also receive the right to exit the program by selling their
interest back to the developer at a price pre-set in the agreement. Id.
2019] Is Community Solar Really a Security? 827
Hawaiʻi’s Securities Commissioner has described that, “[d]isclosure is
at the center of securities regulation.”285
The Securities Act provides for disclosure through its registration
process. In the Securities Act the Hawaii State Legislature
included a list of the information and records required for
registering a security. This list has been tailored to meet the
minimum disclosure that an investor would need in order to be
properly informed about a particular security and the person
selling it.286
This standard registration process is designed for standard securities. In
comparison to the disclosures tailored by the Public Utilities Commission
specifically for community solar,287 general securities disclosures seem
likely to provide substantially weaker consumer protections. In economic
reality, the level of consumer risk implicated in community solar simply
does not rise to a level of a visionary oil well requiring regulation as a
security.
3. Promise of a Valuable Benefit
Despite Coffey’s focus on the element of risk as the defining
characteristic of a security, it has not been the focal point of discussion for
community solar.288 Instead, that focus has often been on whether
participants are motivated by the promise of “profit[].”289 This element
arises directly in the Howey test.290 To be deemed a security, the investment
must be “premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”291 Applying the risk
capital test, this profit motive takes the shape of expecting a “valuable
benefit.”292
CommunitySun’s successful request for a no-action letter did not
mention “risk.”293 The word “profit,” however, was used more than twenty
285. Nohara Letter, supra note 103, at 4.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Coffey, supra note 208, at 375.
289. Id.
290. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (“Such persons have no desire to
occupy the land or develop it themselves; they are attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their
investment.”).
291. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
292. Coffey, supra note 208, at 377.
293. Maco Letter, supra note 98.
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times, and the request’s leading argument was that participants did not
expect a profit.294
No reasonable expectation of profits exists and no entrepreneurial
efforts of others is present in this case, since the owners are
motivated by the ability to self-generate and self-consume a
commodity and by the corresponding reduction in the overall
cost of energy that they are consuming. The owner of a
SolarCondo will not be paid by the utility for the electricity
generated by a SolarCondo, other than by an offset against the
bill for electricity consumed by the owner on property within the
applicable utility district. The owner of a SolarCondo cannot
even carry over his energy credits for other than a limited time,
and can never sell or trade his energy credits, again confirming
no reasonable expectation of profit.295
Nonetheless, the CommunitySun developer acknowledged that participants
may benefit from lower electricity bills, or that the relative value of their
participation could go up over time, if electricity rates rise.296
For the risk capital test, Hawaiʻi’s Securities Commissioner suggested
that the Howey profit motive is narrower than the concept of a “valuable
benefit”:
Hawaii Market Center’s four-part definition of an investment
contract differs from Howey’s in several ways. The most relevant
difference to a [community solar] project is Hawaii Market
Center’s third prong of the definition, which states that the
investor has a “reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit
will accrue . . . .” Howey does not require a “valuable benefit”
but instead requires an expectation of a “profit.” Therefore,
analysis of an investment contract in a jurisdiction following
Hawaii Market Center will be broader in this way than in
jurisdictions that follow Howey.297
The electric utilities echoed this suggestion.298 But this argument is
somewhat difficult to reconcile with the way the phrases “valuable benefit”
294. Id. at 10–11.
295. Id. at 14.
296. Id. at 11–12. Note that the inverse is also true: the value of participation in community
solar could go down over time, if electricity rates fall.
297. Nohara Letter, supra note 103 (second alteration in original).
298. See HECO Comments on Second PUC Proposal, supra note 87, at 32–33 (“Additionally,
the Securities Commissioner noted that Hawaii’s test for securities was broader than the federal test
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and “profit” have been used and interpreted. Courts applying the Howey test
have acknowledged that “profit” can mean “something other than a share of
the profits of an enterprise in a narrow accounting sense,”299 and “have
recognized securities sales even where the promised benefits to the offeree
were indirect, arising from an anticipated increase in the value of the
property received, rather than direct payments from the offeror.”300
This conceptual convergence is the mirror image of an analytical
problem with too broadly interpreting “valuable benefit.” We can presume
that all transactions in goods are motivated by the buyer’s perception that
the purchased good will yield a valuable benefit. If the same is true for
securities, then this element adds little utility to the risk capital test. This
also drives the need for Forman’s recognition that the securities definition
does not apply when a purchaser “is motivated by a desire to use or
consume the item purchased.”301
In almost any context, probing a purchaser’s motivation is tricky
business. For community solar, this may be a particularly difficult
challenge. The economic reality of a community solar project is that the
participants in any one project may have divergent motivations, and that
each individual participant may have multiple motivations.302
CommunitySun argued that participants may be motivated by lower energy
costs and a perception of independence (i.e., “the ability to self-generate
and self-consume a commodity”).303 Other consumers might be motivated
by the prospect of less volatile energy costs.304 Some participants may be
motivated by the perceived benefit of acquiring renewable power rather
than fossil-fuel power, and by the associated reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions.305 And yet others may be motivated by community-focused
facets of a project. For example, a participant may be motived by the
such that an interest that may not be a ‘security’ under the federal test could be deemed a ‘security’
under the Hawaii test.”).
299. See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 133, at 238 (“The term ‘profits’ should not be construed
restrictive. It is apparent from decisions subsequent to Howey that the return promised for the use of the
investors’ money may be something other than a share of the profits of an enterprise in a narrow
accounting sense.” (first citing SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); then citing
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 74 (1959); then citing L.A. Tr. Deed & Mortg.
Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 167 (9th Cir. 1960))).
300. Haw. Comm’r of Sec. v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 110 (Haw. 1971) (first citing
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348–49 (1943); then citing Roe v. United States, 287
F.2d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1961)).
301. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852–53 (1975).
302. See Maco Letter, supra note 98, at 11–12 (describing various motivations for participating
in community solar).
303. Id. at 11, 14.
304. Id. at 11.
305. Id.
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prospect of providing power to a community center or church just as much
as they are motived by the promise of credits on their own electric bill.
This entire palette of potential motivations involves the perception that
participants are acquiring a valuable benefit in the broad sense. An overly
broad application of the valuable benefit element is incapable of discerning
which of these motivations renders the transaction more like a security. It
also fails to identify a decision-making hierarchy for transactions motivated
by a combination of primary, secondary, or tertiary factors. Most
fundamentally, it fails to identify the economic realities of the transaction.
Coffey’s risk capital formulation avoided this tangled complexity by
recognizing that the importance of the valuable benefit element can be
viewed as inversely proportional to the degree of risk.306 “[A]s the degree of
risk to initial value increases, the need for a well-defined ‘profit’ motive
lessens.”307 On this sliding inverse scale, it should also be true that where
there is a low degree of risk to initial value, one needs to find a highly
defined profit motive before finding a security.308 This too can help to
elucidate a more principled line between transactions in goods and
securities, and to show why community solar is not a security. The
relatively low risk associated with community solar means that we should
search for a well-defined profit motive. The diffuse web of potentially
interlocking community solar motivations simply does not provide the
necessary level of definition.
The most profit-like benefit associated with community solar is the
prospect of electric bill savings. Arguments in favor of classifying
community solar as a security, resting on this premise, should be burdened
with first establishing a significant level of systemic risk. Further, those
arguments should be required to connect electricity savings to a well-
defined profit motive that is separate from the motive of cost-effective self-
consumption.
Analogizing to cooperative apartment arrangements (co-ops) illustrates
how difficult it would be to satisfy such a burden. Co-op purchasers transfer
money in exchange for a share in the co-op entity and the right to use a
dwelling unit.309 Despite superficial similarities to purchasing shares in a
business, Coffey pointed to an opinion of the Arizona Attorney General to
306. Coffey, supra note 208, at 375–76.
307. Id. at 401.
308. But see id. at 400 (“[I]t is difficult to say with certainty that a transaction involving a high
degree of risk to initial investment, but lacking the expectation of profits, will be not be called a
security.”).
309. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 842 (1975) (describing the
co-op housing model).
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explain why these arrangements are not securities, and perhaps predicted
the Forman decision to come seven years later: “no profit or income is
generally anticipated.”310 Instead, much as community solar participants
benefit by consuming power, co-op purchasers benefit by living in the unit.
The fact that living in the co-op might be less expensive than other housing
options does not transform the co-op arrangement into a security.
A second apartment analogy, involving condominium units (condos),
similarly shows why community solar interests are not securities. Condo
purchasers typically obtain a dwelling unit and the right to use common
areas of the development. In this context, the SEC has opined that
condominiums offered in conjunction with ancillary rental arrangements—
such as rental pools, exclusive rental agents, or limitations on owner
occupancy—can involve the offer of an investment contract.311 Conversely,
if the purchaser has an unrestricted right to use the unit, or if it is offered
without ancillary rental arrangements, the transaction is not a security.312 A
similar principle appears to hold in other contexts, such as trading stamps,
streetcar tokens, railroad tickets, meal tickets, theatre tickets, and other
examples “too numerous to mention.”313
Community solar participants can receive a valuable benefit in a
variety of forms, including offsetting their power consumption with the
project’s power generation. The fact that this may—or may not—be less
expensive than other sources of power should have very little bearing on
whether or not community solar is regulated as a security.
4. Right to Exercise Control
In the fourth element of the Hawaii Market Center test, an investment
contract requires that “the offeree does not receive the right to exercise
practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the
310. Coffey, supra note 208, at 399 n.138 (citing Op. Ariz. Att’y Gen., [1961] Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 70554).
311. Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales of
Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Securities Act Release No. 5347, 1973 WL
158443, at 3–4 (Jan. 4, 1973) [hereinafter SEC Condo Guidelines]. Interestingly, although this analysis
applies the Howey test, in several places it appears to utilize the phrase “economic benefits”
interchangeably with “profits.” Id. at 2–3.
312. Id. at 2.
313. Trading Stamps, 17 C.F.R. § 231.3890 (1958) (rejecting the argument that trading stamps,
redeemable for cash or merchandise are “evidence of indebtedness” and thus within the securities
definition; noting that “the same argument could be made as to streetcar tokens, meal tickets, Christmas
gift certificates, box tops, railroad or theatre tickets and others too numerous to mention;” and
concluding that “[t]he legislative history and other provisions of the statute indicate that the Congress
did not intend to include such items within the scope of the statute”).
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enterprise.”314 Here again, a superficial analysis might find a security, since
community solar participants are unlikely to undertake technical and
accounting control of a solar facility. But the SEC’s condominium guidance
clarified that “a continuing affiliation between the developers or promoters
of a project and the project by reason of maintenance arrangements does not
make the unit a security.”315 Similarly, a community solar developer’s
continuing role in maintaining the production of solar power and
accounting for electricity credits should not transform community solar into
a security.
A peek into the economic realities of community solar reinforces this
conclusion. Much like in the valuable benefit analysis, we should recognize
that community solar participants must first consume energy before that
consumption can be offset by accumulated community solar credits. These
credits are a critical part of the capital that powers the community solar
value chain—“the thread on which everybody’s beads [are] strung.”316
Community solar participants exercise control over whether those credits
are utilized and monetized by controlling their electricity consumption.317
This control suggests again that community solar is not a security.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia, applying the risk capital test to a
property development syndicate, made a similar observation about an
314. Haw. Comm’r of Sec. v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971).
315. SEC Condo Guidelines, supra note 311, at 4 (emphasis added).
316. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 349 (1943).
317. In Hawaiʻi’s community solar program, the bill credits are forfeited annually if the
consumers’ credits exceed their electricity consumption and other charges. See PUC Adopted Program
Framework, supra note 76, at att. A 28 (“If the monthly net credit exceeds the eligible charges, the value
of excess credits will be rolled over month-to-month. Annually, all remaining bill credits will be
extinguished.”). The treatment of excess credits is a typical detail in distributed solar tariffs and is
addressed differently in various jurisdictions. Similarly, not all community solar programs utilize the
same approach as Hawaiʻi’s. In Colorado, for example, excess credits may carry over from year to year,
but will expire when the consumer terminates service with the applicable utility. See Net Metering, N.C.
STATE UNIV. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR.: DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES &
EFFICIENCY, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/271 (last updated Nov. 30, 2018)
(describing characteristics of Colorado’s community solar model). In Minnesota, excess bill credits
similarly carry over from month to month. See MINN. HOUSE OF REP., XCEL ENERGY’S COMMUNITY
SOLAR GARDEN PROGRAM 7 (2017) (describing characteristics of Minnesota’s community solar model).
But because of statutory language requiring that the utility purchase all energy generated by community
solar projects, the utility is required to annually purchase all outstanding credits. Id. While this provides
a measure of consumer protection, it also partially de-links consumer control over credit utilization. That
control is not completely de-linked, however; the maximum size of a community solar subscription is
based on the consumer’s average consumption over the prior 24 months. Order Rejecting Xcel’s Solar-
Garden Tariff Filing and Requiring the Company to File a Revised Solar-Garden Plan at 16, In re
Petition of Northern States Power Company, dba Xcel Energy, for Approval of Its Proposed Community
Solar Garden Program, No. E-002/M-13-867 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Apr. 7, 2014).
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investment’s value chain.318 Searching for indicia of the managerial control,
the court noted that “the power to make the ultimate decision: to sell or not
to sell” is a critical determinant.319 Where investors retain a contractual
right to control that decision, it cuts against finding a security.
In the context of franchise investments, similar rationale has led to the
conclusion that a franchise agreement is not a security, even if marketed, in
part, as an opportunity for “investment, and/or absentee ownership,” if “the
franchisee exercises policy-making power over his unit of the enterprise.”320
This concept has also been utilized in other contexts, where contractual
managerial rights have been found to negate a finding of a security
irrespective of whether or not an investor actually exercises those
managerial rights.321
Rhetorically, this might clash with Hawaii Market Center’s admonition
that “[i]n order to negate the finding of a security the offeree should have
practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the
enterprise.”322 And the phrase “managerial decisions of the enterprise”323
318. See generally D. K. Properties, Inc. v. Osborne, 240 S.E.2d 293, 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)
(evaluating whether a property development syndicate agreement is a security).
319. See id. (finding that “[s]ince the investors did have such control over that essential decision
from which they expected profits to flow, the trial court erred in holding that, as a matter of law, the
appellants’ scheme involved the sale of unregistered securities”). But see William J. Carney & Barbara
G. Fraser, Defining a Security: Georgia’s Struggle with the Risk Capital Test, 30 EMORY L.J. 73, 118
(1981) (criticizing the approach in D. K. Properties as elevating “form over substance” for focusing
more on “who contributes the essential managerial efforts” than the “principal efforts” influencing
success or failure—perhaps performed even before the syndicate was formed). Note that the court in
D. K. Properties also declined to conclude, without additional evidence, that “in economic reality, the
[promoters] did not perform the essential managerial functions from which profits were to be expected,”
and therefore declined to hold as a matter of law that the sale of land did not involve the sale of
securities. D. K. Properties, Inc., 240 S.E.2d at 296–97.
320. See Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (emphasis added)
(explaining that “it is only necessary that the franchisee exercise policy-making power over his unit of
the enterprise, since to require control over the franchisor’s entire system is incompatible with the
franchising method and would make all franchises investment contracts”). The court also noted that
other parts of the marketing material did not convey the same sense of completely passive investment.
See id. (“At the very least, the typical franchise gives the franchisee sufficient input into decisions which
determine his enterprise’s economic viability to distinguish him from the passive investor protected by
the Acts.”).
321. See J & S Enters. v. Warshawsky, 714 F. Supp. 278, 281 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (applying the
“control” element and noting that the interest of a general partner “would appear to fail the managerial
control test” because a general partner retains managerial rights, irrespective of whether or not an
investor actually exercises those managerial rights); see also Brannon v. Rinzler, 603 N.E.2d 1049, 1052
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that a general partnership agreement provided rights to managerial
control “sufficient to satisfy the last prong of the test and find the investment to not be a security under
Ohio law”).
322. Haw. Comm’r of Sec. v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 111 (Haw. 1971) (emphasis
added).
323. Id.
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may yield the sense that the relevant control must relate to centralized
decision-making, rather than control over a single component in an
enterprise’s value chain.
Wrangling over the degree and quality of control necessary to negate a
security, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc. noted Hawaii Market Center’s criticism of Howey’s
“solely from the efforts of others” element.324 Evaluating a “gigantic and
successful fraud” involving a commission-based scheme to sell self-
motivation seminars and tapes, the court reasoned that it would be “easy to
evade [a strict interpretation of ‘solely’] by adding a requirement that the
buyer contribute a modicum of effort.”325 Thus, the court deployed “a more
realistic test, whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are
the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which
affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”326
This was the standard applied by CommunitySun, arguing that
consumers’ benefit—in the form of lower energy bills—derives from retail
energy price fluctuations, rather than the “entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others.”327 The Georgia court in D. K. Properties also used this
“essential managerial efforts” approach, and called it the “basic policy”
underlying both the risk capital and Howey tests.328 Applying that policy to
the economic realities of community solar, participants’ control over a
critical component of the value chain counsels against finding a security.
B. The Folly of Relying on Registration Exemptions
Are community solar interests securities? I conclude that they are not.
Both of the four-part investment contracts tests are presented in the
conjunctive. A persuasive argument on any one of the four elements will
remove community solar from the definition of an investment contract.
Looking beyond a mechanical application of the tests to hypothetical
scenarios, and instead focusing on economic realities of Hawaiʻi’s approved
framework, it becomes clear that neither the securities laws nor their
exemptions are a good fit for community solar. At the same time, it
324. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) (citations
omitted).
325. Id. at 478, 482 (“Strict interpretation of the requirement that profits to be earned must come
‘solely’ from the efforts of others has been subject to criticism. Adherence to such an interpretation
could result in a mechanical, unduly restrictive view of what is and what is not an investment
contract.”).
326. Id. at 482.
327. Maco Letter, supra note 198, at 12.
328. D. K. Properties, Inc. v. Osborne, 240 S.E.2d 293, 295–96 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
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becomes less clear that additional layers of regulatory disclosures, beyond
those tailored by energy regulators specifically for community solar, would
add any meaningful or necessary consumer protection.329
In simpler terms, community solar projects are not like visionary oil
wells. Nonetheless, legal arguments, standing alone, cannot eliminate the
barrier of securities uncertainty among communities and solar developers.
Indeed, even a definitive regulatory determination in the CommunitySun
example failed to address that uncertainty sufficiently.330 Resolving this
uncertainty in a traditional manner would perhaps require more generalized
regulatory guidance (from both federal and state regulators), akin to the
SEC guidelines that helped to provide certainty for the condominium
industry.331 Another solution, of course, would be a long trip through
litigation. Such litigation could commence in the form of a regulatory
action against a community group or developer for offering an unregistered
security. Or it could perhaps arise from a securities fraud claim prosecuted
by a community solar participant. Either path would threaten to chill
community solar growth until the uncertainty is resolved.
Vermont and Oregon have adopted regulatory and legislative
exemptions, respectively, from the states’ blue sky laws that are intended to
apply to some community solar models.332 However, it is not clear that such
exemptions have been widely utilized, and both have been criticized.333
329. The same argument can also apply to the securities laws’ anti-fraud provisions. In the
context of community solar in Hawaiʻi, it does not appear that those provisions would add a substantial
layer of civil consumer protections over laws applicable to non-securities—such as remedies available
to any consumer for unfair or deceptive trade practices or unfair methods of competition. See HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 480-2, -13 (2018) (providing a private right of action for consumers and enabling the
recovery of treble damages and attorney’s fees). Moreover, if community solar is classified as a security,
those remedies may not be available. See Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp., 849 F.2d 388, 393
(9th Cir. 1988) (“We conclude that the Hawaii Supreme Court, if confronted with the question whether
Hawaii’s baby FTC act applies to claims arising from securities transactions, would hold that it does not.
We are persuaded by the structure of the statute, the legislative command to refer to federal FTCA
jurisprudence, the existence of Hawaii statutes that cover securities transactions, and the trend of the
relatively few applicable judicial decisions.”).
330. See, e.g., HECO Comments on Second PUC Proposal, supra note 87, at 34 (“[D]espite the
existence of an SEC-issued ‘no-action’ letter found with respect to a community solar interest developed
by solar developer, Community Sun LLC, there has been no other ‘no-action’ letter issued for any other
community solar program offered in the multiple jurisdictions that offer community solar programs.
Essentially, despite what stakeholders and developers may attest, the ‘securities’ issue with respect to
these programs is untested and unknown.”).
331. Professor Williamson Chang has proposed sweeping changes to the problematic definition
of a security, which if enacted may more fundamentally address the problem of securities uncertainty.
See Chang, supra note 133, at 420–21.
332. See Vermont SUN Exemption 1, supra note 101 (providing exemptions for community
solar projects that meet one of four sets of criteria, under a “consumer exemption,” a “financing
exemption,” a “commercial exemption,” or a “de minimis exemption”); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.025(12)
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The most frequently proffered solution on this issue is for community
solar projects to qualify for the more generalized exemptions from
registration requirements.334 Those exemptions are far from a panacea.
They do not solve the barrier of complexity and uncertainty for community
groups, who would need to seek legal advice from a securities practitioner
irrespective of whether they are registering a community solar project as a
security, or obtaining an exemption from registration. Moreover,
exemptions do not necessarily resolve the complexity created by the
interplay between federal securities laws and the blue sky laws. Some
securities can be exempt from registration under federal law, but still
require registration (or exemption) under state law.335 Other federal
exemptions preempt state law.336
(2018) (exempting solar cooperatives only); OR. ADMIN. R. §§ 441-025-0120 to -0126 (2018)
(prescribing requirements to qualify for the statutory exemption).
333. See Part 5: Can Securities Exemptions Eliminate Community Solar Obstacles?, supra note
95 (asserting that Oregon’s adoption of a statutory exemption painted a picture that is “neither complete
nor completely rosy,” that it “remains to be seen whether [regulatory] restrictions will relieve much, if
any, of the major securities filings obstacles,” that the statutory exemption applies only to the
cooperative community solar model, and that “[i]n order to incentivize a broader scope of potential
community solar models . . . other structures may need similar exemptions”); Letter from Kyra Hill &
Nick Lawton, Energy Fellow, Lewis & Clark L. Sch., Green Energy Inst., to Shelley Greiner, Rules
Coordinator, Or. Div. Fin. Reg. (Sep. 12, 2014), https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/17985-gei-comments-
on-securities-exemption-rules (questioning, for example, the costs of compliance and the exemption’s
limitation on advertising to prospective participants, and promoting the more liberal approach taken in
the Vermont SUN exemption). Professor Jennifer Taub has evaluated the Vermont SUN exemption
from the perspective of whether it might be expanded to other forms of social investment capital, and
she cautions that its impacts on individual and residential participants should be closely monitored
before such an expansion. Jennifer Taub, New Hopes and Hazards for Social Investment Crowdfunding,
in LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW ECONOMY 165, 183–84 (Melissa K. Scanlan ed., 2017).
334. See, e.g., NREL, SHARED SOLAR, supra note 96, at vii (“The most relevant exemptions for
shared solar programs are Regulation D, including Rule 506 . . . and Rule 504, the intrastate exemption,
and exemptions related to nonprofits); Booth, supra note 94, at 787–800 (discussing possible
exemptions from the federal Securities Act’s registration requirements).
335. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012) (providing a federal, but not state, exemption for
instrastate transactions).
336. Professor Rutherford Campbell has prepared this succinct summary of the state of federal
preemption with respect to blue sky laws:
In summary, state authority over registration has been eliminated with respect to:
(1) offerings under Rule 506 (now including public offerings, if purchasers are
limited to “accredited investors”); (2) offerings by issuers of its securities that are
traded on a national exchange; (3) Tier 2 Regulation A+ offerings; and
(4) crowdfunding offerings of up to $1 million offered only over the Internet.
Essentially all other securities offerings by issuers are subject to state registration
requirements. These include: (1) registered offerings by issuers of securities that
are not traded on a national exchange; (2) private placements under the common
law of section 4(a)(2); (3) offerings under Rule 504; (4) offerings under Rule 505;
(5) Tier 1 offerings under Regulation A+; and (6) intrastate offerings under Rule
147.
2019] Is Community Solar Really a Security? 837
Similarly, an initial offering of a security may be exempt from
registration, but re-sales may not.337 This is an especially relevant
complexity for community solar, where the transferability of an interest is
an important consumer protection, since a participant may leave the
applicable utility service territory.338
Some exemptions utilize the concept of accredited or sophisticated
investors.339 These concepts have limited applicability for community solar
projects that are focused on serving participants from low-income
communities.
Whether community solar interests are securities is a complex
question. It may seem enticing to sidestep that question with a de-risking
approach that utilizes exemptions. But that approach actually adds layers of
complexity, inflexibility, and potentially incompatible constraints. This
solution cannot scale community solar in a way that realizes its potential to
provide a community-focused energy solution.
CONCLUSION—COMMUNITY SOLAR AND SECURITIES AS AN OPPORTUNITY
TO OPERATIONALIZE ENERGY JUSTICE
Rather than try to fit community solar’s square peg into round holes
within the securities laws, a much more direct and appropriate solution
would be to establish that community solar is not an investment contract.
Of course, as noted earlier, this should not apply to every conceivable
formulation of community solar.340 Rather, it should focus on community
solar implemented as a tariff or program already regulated by electric utility
regulators. This comparatively simple and bright line would eliminate the
specter of stifling uncertainty and duplicative regulation, while ensuring
that every form of community solar is subject to the oversight of some
regulatory regime. This approach borrows from the balance adopted for
electric utilities themselves, where utility regulators have exercised
Campbell, Blue Sky Laws, supra note 118, at 622–23.
337. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2018) (prescribing that “securities acquired in [an exempt]
transaction under Regulation D shall have the status of securities acquired in a transaction under section
4(a)(2) of the Act and cannot be resold without registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom”).
338. See PUC Adopted Program Framework, supra note 76, at att. A 29–30 (providing a process
for subscriber transfer or exit).
339. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)–(c) (2018) (enabling exemptions for accredited investors,
or a limited number of sophisticated investors, with sufficient income or net worth).
340. See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text (discussing a community solar structure
under which it is likely that community solar interests would be securities).
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oversight over some securities issues since before the adoption of federal
securities laws.341
More fundamentally and more forward-looking, this formulation of
regulatory responsibilities can succeed in advancing the community solar
and securities debate into the 21st century. While I have attempted to
faithfully apply the risk capital and Howey tests to the economic realities of
community solar, I also acknowledge those tests are rooted in 20th century
notions more relevant to visionary oil wells than they are to modern
concepts of energy justice.
In other words, the arguments in this Article have been largely (and
intentionally) presented in the wrong frame. Energy justice is at the core of
community solar’s raison d’etre.342 Energy justice principles should also be
fundamental to resolving questions about its implementation. Implementing
energy justice means, in part, advancing energy decisions and debates
beyond law and policy frames that are all too often “limited to the domains
of engineering and economics.”343
It is likely a step too far to ask securities regulators to dive into the
principles of energy justice. But for utility regulators, as the U.S. energy
system undergoes a renewable energy transition,344 those principles should
be at the forefront of the debate. Utility regulators who rise to this task will
be far better positioned to understand the energy needs of the low-income
and vulnerable communities that true community solar is designed to serve,
and to design disclosures and other program features that are tailored to
those needs. These realities call for a solution that definitively removes
regulated utility programs and tariffs from the definition of a security. This
could be accomplished by legislation or by regulatory guidance, although in
practice it would likely require coordinated federal and state action to avoid
re-creating the complexity of competing securities definitions.
Reframing the regulatory boundaries in this way could also have
implications far beyond community solar. The future electric grid is
341. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 172, at 914–19 (describing the role of utility regulators
in overseeing securities issues, before the 2005 repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act Pub.
L. No. 74–333, 49 Stat. 803); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-17 (2018) (requiring Public Utilities
Commission approval for the issuance of securities by a public utility corporation).
342. See supra notes 49–62 and accompanying text.
343. See Sovacool et al., Energy Decisions Reframed as Justice and Ethical Concerns, 1
NATURE ENERGY 16, 16 (2016) (investigating “how concepts from justice and ethics can inform energy
decision-making”).
344. For example, New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision proceeding involves a wide-
ranging set of initiatives intended to “consider fundamental changes in the manner in which utilities
provide service . . . including the relationships among utilities and customers, bulk markets, and
regulators.” See Order Instituting Proceeding at 4, In re Reforming the Energy Vision, No. 14-M-0101
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 25, 2014).
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envisioned to be far more participatory than today, balanced by an untold
number of micro-transactions that will enable consumers to be both buyers
and sellers of energy and energy grid services.345 Energy justice principles
require us to design that participatory electricity grid in a way that ensures
equitable access, availability, and affordability.346 How will low-income
and vulnerable communities be invited and empowered to participate? Will
access and power be skewed in favor of single-family homeowners,
sophisticated investors, or other privileged classes? Or will the grid of the
future create a fairer and more robust method for all to participate in the
enormously important economic and social fabric of the energy sector?
These questions will undoubtedly require further analysis and debate.
And interestingly, securities laws may be as applicable in that debate as
they are to community solar. Many envision that a participatory electric
grid will be mediated by digital blockchain transactions.347 It remains
uncertain whether such digital tokens are within the definition of a
security.348 If transactions use such digital tokens on a regulated grid, that
use should be removed from the definition of a security.
Resolving the securities uncertainties proactively, and with a focus on
justice principles, is not too much to ask. The intellectual roots of securities
laws are concerned with the perils of concentrating economic power in the
hands of a small group, accountability, and a sense of fiduciary obligation
toward public interests.349 These concepts are equally familiar to public
345. See generally Eisen & Mormann, supra note 25, at 114–15 (envisioning a system “that
enables some ratepayers to actively participate in and benefit from the newly created markets”); see also
Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 30 (noting that “leading states are working to make the grid
‘participatory’”).
346. See, e.g., Eisen & Mormann, supra note 25, at 114–15 (arguing that an electricity trading
paradigm “will, on the whole, prove more equitable than the current system”).
347. See, e.g., James Blanden & Michael Cottrell, How Utilities Are Using Blockchain to
Modernize the Grid, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 23, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/how-utilities-are-using-
blockchain-to-modernize-the-grid (“Blockchain has grabbed the attention of the heavily regulated power
industry as it braces for an energy revolution in which both utilities and consumers will produce and sell
electricity. Blockchain could offer a reliable, low-cost way for financial or operational transactions to be
recorded and validated across a distributed network with no central point of authority.”).
348. For example, in December 2018, the Token Taxonomy Act was introduced in Congress.
H.R. 7356, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018). The Act would remove digital tokens from the definition of a
security under the federal securities acts. See id. Mirroring some of the uncertainty in the community
solar context, at least one state—Wyoming—has already exempted blockchain tokens from its blue sky
law. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-206 (2018); see generally Nate Crosser, Comment, Initial Coin
Offerings As Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility Tokens Securities?, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 379
(2018) (analyzing whether the SEC should treat digital tokens as securities).
349. See Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1212–23 (1999) (“The issues of primary concern . . . were the
concentration of economic power in the hands of a small group of bankers, corporate executives, and
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utility regulators and lie at the heart of innovative community-focused
energy solutions.
directors; management’s lack of accountability to the company’s shareholders; and the lack of public
accountability or concern for the public among those wielding concentrated power.”).
